

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
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The battle-fields of Virginia

Jedediah Hotchkiss, William Allan



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GENERAL T. J. JACKSON

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NEW YORK:

D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY.

LONDON: TRUBNER & CO.

1867.

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THE
BATTLE-FIELDS OF VIRGINIA.

CHANCELLORSVILLE;

EMBRACING THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST BATTLE OF FREDERICKS-
BURG TO THE DEATH OF LIEUTENANT-
GENERAL JACKSON.

By **JED. HOTCHKISS,**
LATE CAPTAIN AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEER SECOND CORPS, A. N. V.,

AND

WILLIAM ALLAN,
LATE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND CHIEF OF ORDNANCE SECOND CORPS, A. N. V.

ILLUSTRATED BY FIVE MAPS AND A FULL-LENGTH LIKENESS

OF

LIEUT.-GEN. T. J. JACKSON.



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BY D. VAN NOSTRAND,

In the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of
New York.

C. S. WESTCOTT & Co., Printers. 79 John Street, N. Y.

PREFACE.

It is the object of the succeeding pages to give a plain narrative of one of the most important events of our great civil contest. Our information has been drawn, almost entirely, from official documents; the contemporary newspaper accounts being too conflicting and unreliable to be available. We have mainly consulted the official reports of the officers engaged on both sides, and the very valuable Report of the Federal Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. By combining a simple narrative of facts with accurate maps, showing the topography of the country, and the successive positions of both armies, maps prepared, for the most part, by the direction of General Lee, immediately after the battle, we hope to afford a hand-book to the traveller, and to give to the general reader a clear and truthful conception of one of the most important battles of the late war. All extended criticism has been purposely avoided. In regard to events so recent, good taste and good judgment would alike seem to require it. If we

shall make "Chancellorsville" more intelligible to some of those who, not three years ago, were electrified by the great drama there enacted, and shall contribute our mite to the treasury of the future historian, our ambition will be more than satisfied.

We have added a sketch of the last days of the Confederate chieftain whose name will ever be associated with Chancellorsville, as the scene of his last and perhaps most brilliant achievement. It is from the pen of Dr. HUNTER MCGUIRE, Professor of Surgery in the Richmond Medical College, and late Medical Director for Lieut.-Gen. JACKSON. It will possess a present and future value as the most faithful and accurate account now in existence of the wounds and death of this great man.

STAUNTON, VA. *April 1, 1866.*

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

WITH the battle of the 13th of December, at Fredericksburg, the eventful campaign of 1862 closed, in Virginia. Worn out by a campaign unsurpassed in long and toilsome marches, and in the number and violence of its contests, both armies were glad of the opportunity for rest and recuperation. The "Army of the Potomac," crippled by a series of fearful reverses on every field, from the Chickahominy to Harper's Ferry, and now paralyzed by the last great misfortune of Fredericksburg, imperatively demanded repose, that its material losses might be repaired, and its morale recovered. Nor to the "Army of Northern Virginia," though with an organization unimpaired, and a magnificent morale, was the quiet of winter quarters unnecessary. The favors of Fortune, it is true, had been bestowed upon it, with unusual constancy, but the struggle had been unequal and exhaustive. To oppose to the large and readily recruited numbers of the Union Armies, amply supplied with all the matériel and accessories of war, the Confederacy possessed but very limited resources of men, matériel and supplies. General Lee needed time to reclothe and re-equip his troops. Time and oppor-

tunity were needed to allow the conscription to fill up his depleted ranks ; and the recruits thus obtained required discipline and training. Thus it was that the approach of winter was not unwelcome to either party.

Fredericksburg is at the head of tide-water and navigation on the Rappahannock River. The river here is about three hundred yards in width, and of sufficient depth for the smaller class of ships and steamers. On the northern side, a range of hills rises immediately from the river, and extending for a long distance above and below the town, forms the now far-famed "Stafford Heights." Beyond these, towards the Potomac River and Aquia Creek, the country is very hilly and full of ravines. This country is, however, well watered and well wooded. Occupying the heights along the river, General Burnside encamped his army in the country to the rear, making use of the Aquia Railroad and the Potomac River, as avenues of supply. Here, with a water base, entirely under his control, close at hand, and with a stream fordable at but few places, and quickly made impassable by the mountain rains, in his front, he rested in security. No attack was to be feared in such a position, even had the season and the condition of the roads rendered one probable.

On the south side, the hills rise at some distance from the river, leaving an intervening plain. A short distance above Fredericksburg the ridge approaches close to the river, opposite Falmouth ; but from this

point it gradually falls away from the river, until at a distance of four or five miles below the town it is a mile and a half wide. The hills continue down the river at a distance ranging from one fourth to one and a half miles from it. General Lee occupied these heights, extending his infantry from Banks' Ford on the left to Port Royal on the right. His cavalry extended his left to Beverly's Ford, on the upper Rappahannock, and scoured the country on his right, included between the Rappahannock and Pamunkey rivers. His main channels of supply were by way of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, and from the depôts on the Central Railroad. The portion of his line stretching from a point opposite Falmouth to Hamilton's Crossing, had been the Confederate position at the battle of December 13th, and was strongly fortified. It was now occupied by the First, or General Longstreet's Corps. General Jackson's Corps (the Second), stretched from the neighborhood of Hamilton's Crossing to Port Royal, fortifying the same crest of hills. The crossings of the river, which are but few and difficult, were carefully guarded. In this position Lee was able to put his army into winter quarters, and to be at the same time ready to meet any demonstrations that his opponent might make. The lateness of the season, the difficulty in obtaining supplies, and his imperfect means of communication, rendered an offensive campaign on the part of the Confederate commander unadvisable.

During the six weeks that followed the battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside, notwithstanding his heavy losses and the unfavorable condition of his troops, made two attempts to cross the river and renew his attack on the Confederate army (Map No. 1). His first intention was to cross about the last of December with his whole force. His plan was as follows: to send out a force of twenty-five hundred cavalry, to the upper Rappahannock, of which one thousand picked men, with four pieces of artillery, were to cross at Kelly's Ford, and then cross the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, tap the Virginia Central Railroad, push on to James River, and cross it in Goochland county, break the Lynchburg, Danville, and Weldon railroads, and moving through the Confederate lines south of Petersburg, join the Federal troops at Suffolk. To increase the chances of success of this column, by concealing the design, the remainder of the cavalry were to make demonstrations towards Warrenton and Culpeper, and part, after going to Raccoon Ford, were to return. These movements were intended to damage, as much as possible, the Confederate lines of communication, and to draw Lee's attention from the real point of attack; and when they were advanced sufficiently for this purpose, it was contemplated to throw the whole Federal army across the river at Seddon's, a point six miles below Fredericksburg. Once over, the design was to turn Lee's right and throwing it back beyond the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, to cut his communications with Rich-

mond, and then to defeat him, or by forcing a retreat towards Gordonsville, uncover the Confederate Capital. In the execution of this plan, Burnside had gone so far as to order ten days' rations and forage to be provided, and three days' cooked rations to be prepared, and his cavalry had already reached Kelly's Ford, when a telegram from President Lincoln, prohibiting further operations without his consent, put a stop to the movement. The action of the President in this matter had been brought about by the very strong and general opposition in the Federal army to this campaign.

The urgent representations made by General Burnside's subordinates of the impolicy and rashness of the undertaking had induced Mr. Lincoln to interfere. Nor, it must be confessed, is it easy to see in this movement any traces of that sagacity which, on other occasions, had characterized General Burnside. He proposed now to do, with a weakened and demoralized army, what he had failed to do on the 13th of December, with enthusiastic and well-appointed legions. He proposed to cross a difficult stream, in the face of a vigilant and powerful foe, and had this been effected, would have found himself opposite the centre of Jackson's corps. He would thus have been compelled to fight under circumstances not dissimilar from those of the first battle of Fredericksburg, save that his own army was now in much worse condition. Had success attended his first efforts, the deep mud of the winter must have speedily put a stop to all prog-

ress, and forced a relinquishment of the campaign. Upon receipt of the President's order, the cavalry expedition was abandoned, and they were sent to intercept General Stuart, who was making a raid in the rear of the Federal army.

This raid of General Stuart was undertaken to gain information and to damage the Federal communications. After the battle of the 13th of December, the cavalry of General Lee's army was thus distributed: W. H. F. Lee's brigade was sent below Port Royal on the line of the Rappahannock; Hampton's to Culpeper to picket the Rapidan, Hazel, and Rappahannock rivers; Fitz Lee's to Guiney's Dépôt. Jones' brigade was still in the Valley, and did not participate in any of the operations east of the Blue Ridge. On Christmas-day, Stuart set out with the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and of Fitz Lee, crossed the Rapidan and Rappahannock at Elley's and Kelly's fords, and having brought up Hampton's from Culpeper, marched in two parallel columns upon Dumfries. About mid-day, on December 27th, Fitz Lee struck the Telegraph Road, five miles below Dumfries, and his advance regiment (5th Va., Colonel Rosser) dispersed a small force and captured a wagon-train at that point. Then, pushing on to Dumfries, they, with the remainder of the expedition, which there joined them, skirmished for a day with the garrison, which was of infantry, and held a strong position. Proceeding next towards the Occoquon, Stuart ran into a force of several regiments, which were routed, with the loss of their camp,

wagons, and supplies. He next proceeded to Burke's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and having done all the damage possible to the track, made a circuit through Fairfax C. H. and Aldie, and then, returning through Warrenton, resumed his old camp after an absence of ten days. The attempt made by General Averill to intercept him at Warrenton failed of success, he having passed through that place several hours before Averill reached it.

After consultation with the Federal President and Commander-in-chief, Burnside determined upon another effort in the offensive (Map No. 2). His former design had become public, and it was necessary to form a new plan of campaign. Having made a careful reconnoissance of the river and Lee's position, he selected, on this occasion, Banks' and United States fords as his points of crossing, and the left flank of the Confederate army as his point of attack. His general plan was similar to that entertained afterwards by General Hooker; by turning the Confederate left flank, to force Lee to fight at a disadvantage, or lose his communication with Richmond. By the middle of January all was ready, and while a demonstration was made at Seddon's, the point selected for the former crossing, the mass of the Federal army was ordered across the river at the fords above named. On the day after the movement began, a terrible rain and snow storm set in, and soon the roads were converted into deep mud. Long before the columns reached the fords, wagons, pieces of artillery, even

horsemen, were mired in great numbers. It was found impossible to bring the army to the river in a condition for crossing. The great mass of the Federal army had entered upon this movement unwillingly, and now the opposition to it became universal and urgent, the dissatisfaction with the General in command, open. Delay had deprived the movement of the character of a surprise. A crossing would now have to be made in the face of whatever force the Confederate commander might choose to bring into action. Under these circumstances, Burnside once more reluctantly abandoned his intention, and on the 22d of January ordered his troops back to their camps.

With regard to both these attempts of the Federal army to cross the river, General Lee was well informed from the outset. By means of a thorough system of scouts, every change in the Union army was known to him within a few hours after its occurrence. In addition to this, a discovery of the alphabet of the Federal signals, enabled his signal officers to read the orders sent from Burnside's headquarters to his different corps.

Near Gen. Jackson's headquarters, at Moss Neck, a party was kept constantly on duty to take down the messages transmitted through a signal-station on the Stafford side. On the occasion of both these intended crossings of the Federal army, dispositions were made to meet the threatened attack. Jackson even concealed, at convenient points near the crossings on his line, artillery which might be brought

into immediate use whenever the attempt to cross should be made, but the position of which, in the meantime, could not be suspected.

These two abortive expeditions destroyed what remained, after the disaster of Fredericksburg, of the confidence of his troops and his government in General Burnside's capacity for a separate command. Undertaken mainly, no doubt, in consequence of the mortification felt at the former defeat, they brought to the Army of the Potomac a change of commanders. After the failure of the second attempt, dissatisfaction was so openly expressed by officers of high rank as to be subversive of military discipline, and Burnside felt called upon to demand the dismissal of a number from the service. Upon the refusal of the President to approve this measure, he offered his resignation, which was accepted so far as regarded the command of the Army of the Potomac. This, on the 26th of January, was turned over to Major-General Joseph Hooker.

A long interval of quiet now intervened. For more than two months the condition of the roads rendered any important movement impracticable. Both leaders devoted this time to improving the discipline, perfecting the organization and filling up the ranks of their armies. Lee addressed himself assiduously to his task. His attention was first turned to supplies and equipment. All the available means for the purpose were put into requisition. Agents were sent out through the country drained by his army,

and in conjunction with the authorities at Richmond, gathered supplies in every quarter. These were collected at various depôts convenient to his troops. And when the usual method of procuring supplies by purchase and the tithe failed, General Lee issued an appeal to the people which soon filled his commissariat. The reserve artillery and all the surplus transportation of the army were sent to the rear, where it was more easy to forage them. The arsenals at Richmond were kept constantly at work to re-equip his army, and arm the men coming in. Much of his field artillery was replaced by new and improved guns. Careful attention was bestowed upon discipline. Many regulations were introduced to promote that system and order which is the life of armies. When the weather permitted, the troops were constantly engaged in field exercises. Prompt measures were taken to prevent desertion, and those who had deserted were brought back in large numbers. The number of absentees from various causes was very great in the beginning of the year. By the Spring it was reduced more than half. The Conscription Act, now fairly put into operation, increased the strength of the army daily. Jackson's corps grew in three months from twenty-five to thirty-three thousand muskets.

Many changes were made in organization, especially in the staff. The staff was made a complete organization of itself, extending from regimental to army headquarters, and ceased to be a mere appendage of the brigade, division, and corps commanders.

Several of its departments were extended in their operations and more fully developed. The artillery, which had heretofore been attached to the different infantry and cavalry commands, was now consolidated into one corps, under the command of General Pendleton, as Chief of Artillery. This gave a compactness and uniformity to this part of the army and promoted an *esprit du corps* which increased greatly its efficiency. A similar organization had already been given to the cavalry. An engineer regiment was now organized, in order to provide for the army an experienced corps for the construction of bridges, roads and fortifications.

The splendid morale of this army did not need improvement, but it enabled it to bear without injury the privations and hardships of the winter. Insufficient clothing and scanty rations produced no effect upon it. When the spring opened, General Lee found himself at the head of an army unsurpassed in discipline, and all the hardy virtues of the soldier, strengthened by the additions of the winter, reinvigorated by the compactness and order which had been given to its organization, with an enthusiasm acquired by a long series of victories, and ready to add to that series a triumph more remarkable and illustrious than any of its predecessors.

During the winter General Lee extended and strengthened the fortifications in rear of Fredericksburg, and constructed a system of elaborate works along his whole front. This line, reaching from

Banks' Ford to Port Royal, extended for more than twenty-five miles. No time, labor, or skill, was spared in its construction, and when completed an almost impregnable barrier was presented to the progress of the Federal army throughout this whole distance. Behind these works the Confederate army was as secure from attack in front as Wellington at Torres Vedras.

Taking advantage of the condition of the roads, which was such as to prevent operations on the line of the Rappahannock, Lee, about the first of February, detached Longstreet with two divisions (half of his corps), and sent him to the south side of James river, between Petersburg and Suffolk, to resist the attack being organized in that quarter. Longstreet was engaged during the remainder of the winter in an active campaign against the Federal forces, in the neighborhood of Suffolk. The absence of these divisions diminished the Army of Northern Virginia by one fourth, and they did not rejoin Lee until after the battle of Chancellorsville. The Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Regiments of Virginia Volunteers, of Smith's Brigade, Early's Division, were also absent, accompanying Gen. Imboden on a raid to Western Virginia.

The condition of the army of the Potomac when he assumed command, and the changes effected in it, are thus described by General Hooker: "It had recently returned from two unsuccessful efforts to cross the river and drive the enemy from his position. The first resulting so disastrously as to render a second effort soon after, even with pro-

pitious weather, almost futile. Before the second effort ended, the winter rains set in and all operations for a while were suspended; the army literally finding itself buried in mud from which there was no hope of extrication before spring.

“With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this time, public and private, afford abundant evidence of its demoralization; and these, in their turn, had their effect upon the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me, desertions were at the rate of about two hundred a day. So anxious were parents, wives, brothers, and sisters, to relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen's clothing to assist them in escaping from service. At that time, perhaps, a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. The Emancipation Proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they would never have embarked in the war had they anticipated this action of the government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of the camps.

"I may also state, that at the moment I was placed in command, I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. These were scattered all over the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown. A copy of this return was furnished the Commanding General of the army.

"My first object was to prevent desertion ; and when this was accomplished my whole attention was directed to securing the return of absentees, and rendering those present as comfortable and contented as circumstances would allow. I granted leaves of absence and furloughs to a limited extent, and in such manner as to enable all to be absent for a few days in the course of the winter. The disloyal officers were dismissed the service as soon as evidence of the fact was brought to my knowledge. The express trains were examined by the Provost-Marshal, and all citizen's clothing found was burned.

"Important changes were introduced into the various staff departments, and especially in that of the Inspector-General, which was thoroughly organized and filled with the most competent officers I could select in the army. Believing idleness to be the great evil in all armies, every effort was made to keep the troops employed ; and whenever the weather would permit it, they were engaged in field exercises.

“The cavalry was consolidated and placed in a higher state of efficiency than had before been known in our service, and whenever the state of the roads and the rivers would admit of a movement, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy’s pickets and outposts, and gather supplies from the country in their possession; my object being to encourage and stimulate in the breasts of our men by successes, however small, a feeling of superiority over our adversaries. In this we were eminently successful. The infantry grew in confidence, and the cavalry in all their encounters, acquired a character, in both armies, before unknown to that branch of the service.

“Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee’s army. With a rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army had, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies.

“During the time allowed us for preparation, the army made rapid strides in discipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled by the return of absentees. All were actuated

by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the Republic."

During the three months that followed Hooker's assignment to command, no active operations were undertaken by either army, except some cavalry demonstrations, which were generally few and feeble, so impracticable were the roads. On February 10th, W. H. F. Lee, with his brigade, attempted to surprise and capture Gloucester Point, but the Federal troops having received an intimation of his intention, he returned without effecting his object. After this the Confederate cavalry contented themselves with guarding the flanks of the army. Fitz Lee's brigade was sent to Culpeper to relieve Hampton, who was sent to the rear to recruit. W. H. F. Lee remained on the lower Rappahannock to protect the right flank. The Federal cavalry employed themselves in preparing thoroughly for the spring campaign. Every effort was made to improve the equipment, organization, and *esprit du corps* of this part of the Federal army, and thus to neutralize the inferiority it had always shown in Virginia. About the middle of March, Hooker determined to test the result by experiment. General Averill, commanding one of his cavalry divisions, on the morning of the 17th March, with his division, attacked the Confederate lines at Kelly's Ford. At this point there was but a small cavalry picket of twenty men, which General Fitz Lee had ordered to be increased to sixty, on the evening of

the 16th, when informed of the approach of the Union troops. But a small part of the reinforcement, however, had reached the proper place, when the attack was made next morning. Fitz Lee's brigade, and a battery of horse artillery under Major Pelham were at Culpeper. General Stuart happened to be there also, at the time of the attack. Averill soon forced a crossing, and overwhelming the picket, captured Captain Breckenridge, who commanded it, with more than half his men. He then moved on in the direction of Culpeper Court-House. Fitz Lee, who, with the greater part of his brigade, was near the railroad bridge, in anticipation of an attempt to cross at that point, now turned to the right and marched to meet the advancing column. He came upon Averill about one mile from the ford, and a stubborn and desperate fight at once began. The largely superior force of the Federal cavalry, encouraged as they were by the successful crossing of the river, gave them for a time the advantage, and it was only by desperate valor, and with severe loss, that Fitz Lee was able to maintain himself. Gradually, however, the vigor of the Federal onset lessened, and the Confederates having been dismounted, and placed in a good position perpendicular to the road, were enabled to check, effectually, Averill's advance. The battle raged until late in the evening. Averill then withdrew, and recrossed the river. He was pursued to the river, but protected by the darkness of the night recrossed without serious loss. The Confederate success in this affair was

largely due to the ability and zeal with which their artillery was used, and the severest loss they had to deplore was the death of Major Pelham, who commanded it. No young officer in the Confederate army had achieved a more brilliant reputation, and there was none whose courage and ability gave promise of greater success.

After this time no operations worthy of note took place until the great Campaign of Chancellorsville. Early in April, Hooker was ready to move, and anxious to do so, before the term of service (now almost out) of the forty thousand nine-months and two-years men in his army should expire. Lee, informed of the enemy's movements, hastened his preparations for an active campaign.

On the 13th of the month General Hooker actually sent forward his cavalry, who were to be the first to commence operations; by a raid on the Confederate lines of communication, but in consequence of high waters and bad roads, they were stopped at Kelly's Ford, and did not again move until the last of the month, when the whole movement was finally undertaken.

The strength of the opposing armies, in April, was as follows :

STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE "ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC."

Corps.	Division.	Men.
1st, Reynolds..	{ Wadsworth, Robinson, Doubleday, } 17,000
2d, Couch.....	{ Hancock, Gibbons, French, } 15,000
3d, Sickles.....	{ Birney, Berry, Whipple, } 18,000
6th, Sedgwick.....	{ Brooks, Howe, Newton, } 24,000
5th, Meade.....	{ Griffin, Sykes, Humphreys, } 36,000
11th, Howard	{ Devens, Steinwehr, Schurz, }	
12th, Slocum	{ Williams, Geary, }	
Cavalry, Stoneman..	{ Pleasanton, Buford, Averill, } 13,000
Artillery (included above).... 400 pieces.		
Total		123,000

STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE "ARMY OF
NORTHERN VIRGINIA."

Corps.	Division.	Brigade.	Muskets.
2d, Jackson's...	A. P. Hill's,	Heth, Pender, Archer, McGowan,	11,100
		Lane, Thomas,	
	D. H. Hill's,	Ramseur, Rodes, Doles,	9,000
		Iverson, Colquitt, Colston,	
	Trimble's,	Jones, Nicholls, Paxton,	6,000
		Gordon,	
	Early's,	Hays, Smith, Hoke,	7,400
1st, Longstreet's	Anderson's,	Mahone, Posey, Wilcox,	17,000
		Perry, Wright,	
	McLaws'	Kershaw, Semmes, Wofford, Barksdale,	
Stuart's Cavalry	Fitz Lee's brigade.....		1,800
	Hampton's (not present)...	
	W. H. F. Lee's brigade....		900
Artillery, 170 pieces.....			5,000
Total			*58,200

* We have not the exact data on which to give the *effective* strength, but an addition of four thousand to the total above would be a liberal estimate.

The roads having dried sufficiently by the last of April, General Hooker put his whole army in motion. (Map No. 2.) His plan was, after having cut and destroyed Lee's communications, by means of his large cavalry force, to throw the main portion of his infantry on the left flank of the Confederate army, and if possible, to crush it while cut off from its supplies. Fearing the difficulty and danger of forcing a passage in front of Lee, a column was to be sent to the upper Rappahannock, and having crossed that river and the Rapidan, to uncover United States and Banks' fords. To conceal his real design, demonstrations were made all along the line. About the 21st, a small force of infantry was sent to Kelly's Ford, to attract attention. At the same time General Doubleday, with his division, was sent to Port Conway, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, to make a feint. He built large fires, to give the impression of a large force, and made a demonstration of crossing with his pontoons. After his return Colonel Morrow, with the 24th Michigan, went down on the 23d of April and crossed the river at Port Royal. On the 26th and 27th, orders were issued for the movement of the army. The cavalry, still in the neighborhood of Kelly's Ford were to go forward under the instructions given on the 12th. (Appendix No. 1.) The Twelfth Corps, Gen. Slocum, and the Eleventh, Gen. Howard, were ordered to move from their camps near Falmouth, by way of Hartwood Church, to Kelly's Ford ; similar orders were given to the Fifth Corps, Gen. Meade. This column

moved with as little transportation as possible, and with but one battery to a division: the remainder having been parked near Banks' Ford, to await until the advance of the Federal troops, down the south bank of the Rapidan, should open the crossing. The men were provided with eight days' rations in their haversacks. (Appendix No. 2.) They reached Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th. A force was put over in boats, below the ford, which moved up and took possession of it; and during the night the Eleventh Corps was thrown over. On the morning of the 29th, the Twelfth and Fifth Corps also crossed. The infantry now moved in two columns; the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps under General Slocum, towards Germania, and the Fifth towards Elley's Ford on the Rapidan. General Pleasanton accompanied the infantry, with one brigade of cavalry. The remainder of the cavalry, under General Stoneman, pushed on towards Rapidan Station and Louisa Court-House.

The Confederate force between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, at this time, consisted of but the whole of Fitz Lee's, and two regiments of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigades and a small battalion of horse artillery, all under command of General Stuart. This force amounted to about twenty-seven hundred men. With it, Stuart skirmished with the Federal columns, and hung on their flanks and rear, until he found out their strength and the direction of their march: when, detaching W. H. F. Lee, with his two regiments, to impede and harass Stoneman, he, with Fitz Lee's

brigade passed the Rapidan, and re-established connection with the left of the Confederate army. The Federal columns under Slocum and Meade, reached Germania and Elley's Fords, respectively, on the evening of the 29th, and having driven off the pickets on guard at these points, crossed the river during the night and next morning moved on toward Chancellorsville.

While these movements were in progress on the right of the Federal army, the other portions of it had also been put in motion. On the morning of the 28th, General Couch, with two divisions of the Second Corps, was ordered to Banks' Ford, with instructions to detach a force to United States Ford, the whole to be in readiness to join the right wing of the army as soon as the fords should be uncovered. The remaining division of the Second Corps was left at its camp at Falmouth, which was in full view of the south side of the river, to conceal the movement. On the same day General Sedgwick, with the Sixth, Third, and First Corps, was ordered to move preparatory to crossing the river at the mouth of Deep Run (Franklin's Crossing), and Pratt's House (Pollock's), three and four miles below Fredericksburg. Pontoons were laid at three points, and at daylight on the 29th, troops were thrown over, and demonstrations made against the Confederate lines. (Appendix No. 3.)

On this day General Jackson's Corps (with the exception of Early's Division, which was already there) was moved up, from its camps at Grace Church and

Moss Neck to the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing. General Early took position to the left of Hamilton's throwing forward his advance to the River Road, and General Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, formed a line of battle on the right, extending to the river at the mouth of Massaponax Creek. During the day he fortified his position and kept up an artillery duel with the enemy. A. P. Hill's and Trimble's divisions were formed into second and third lines. In this position, with Anderson's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's Corps, still on the river above Fredericksburg, General Lee awaited the development of the plans of the Federal commander. The inactivity of the force under Sedgwick indicated to him that movements were being made elsewhere, and, during the afternoon of the 29th, he received definite information from Stuart, of the large columns which were marching towards Germania and Elley's. General Anderson was then directed to proceed to Chancellorsville, with Wright's brigade of his division, and having concentrated there Mahone's and Posey's brigades from United States Ford, to cover the roads converging at that place, from Germania and Elley's fords. Anderson occupied Chancellorsville during the night of the 29th, but having learned that the Federal troops had already crossed the Rapidan, and that they were in large force, he prepared to withdraw on the next morning.

On the morning of the 30th, the positions of the opposing armies were as follows: The four divisions,

constituting Jackson's Corps of the Confederate army, were in line of battle at Hamilton's Crossing, extending to the left for a mile or more, and on the right to the Rappahannock, at the mouth of Massaponax Creek. McLaws' division of Longstreet's Corps was still in its camp, extending from Fredericksburg two or three miles up the river. Barksdale's brigade of this division occupied the town. Of Anderson's division, three brigades were at Chancellorsville, while Perry's brigade was on guard opposite Falmouth, and Wilcox's at Banks' Ford. The reserve artillery, under General Pendleton, had been ordered up to the vicinity of Massaponax Church. Stuart, with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry, having crossed to the south side of the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford during the night, was moving down to oppose Slocum. W. H. F. Lee, with his two regiments, was at Culpeper, in Stoneman's front. The cavalry, in recruiting camps, had been ordered to join the army, but was not yet up.

The left wing of the Federal army, under Sedgwick, comprising the First, Third, and Sixth corps, was on the river three miles below Fredericksburg; a portion on the south side threatening Jackson's position. Of the right wing the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under Slocum, were on the south side of the Rappahannock, at Germania Ford, having overpowered and captured part of the picket at that place after an obstinate resistance; Meade, with the Fifth Corps, at Elley's Ford, which he had crossed with little opposition. Two divisions of the Second (Couch's) were at Banks'

Ford, with one brigade and a battery thrown out to United States Ford ; the other division (Gibbon's) was in its camp at Falmouth. The reserve artillery and transportation of the army was under guard of the force at Banks' Ford. With the exception of Pleasanton, who, with a small brigade, accompanied Slocum, the whole cavalry, under Stoneman, was in the neighborhood of Culpeper.

During the 30th, no change of importance was made, on the Confederate side, in the forces at Hamilton's Crossing. They remained in line of battle observing Sedgwick, who continued inactive. On the right of the Federal army the columns under Meade and Slocum marched early in the morning towards Chancellorsville. Meade met with no opposition, and soon reached his destination. Near Chancellorsville his skirmishers came up with the rear guard of Anderson, who had commenced to withdraw at daylight, on the Plank and Turnpike roads towards Fredericksburg. The Federal skirmishers, who, having captured the picket on the Elley's road, pressed on with vigor, were repulsed, and after this the Confederate forces withdrew, without molestation, to the position selected near the junction of the Mine and Plank roads. Slocum's column was impeded by the Confederate cavalry. Stuart, moving down from Raccoon Ford, threw out the Third Virginia cavalry, Colonel Owens, in Slocum's front, and with the remainder of his force harassed his flank. By this means Stuart impeded the march of the Federal

column until mid-day, when, learning that Meade was already at Chancellorsville, he drew off the forces immediately under his command towards Spotsylvania Court-House, while Colonel Owens, with his regiment, fell back towards Fredericksburg, and joined General Anderson.

While the right of the Federal army was thus converging to Chancellorsville, General Hooker was making corresponding dispositions elsewhere. Couch, with his two divisions, had been moved up to United States Ford; and when the withdrawal of Anderson from Chancellorsville uncovered this point, he was directed to lay pontoons, cross, and join Slocum. About mid-day the Third corps, General Sickles, was detached from Sedgwick, and ordered to proceed with all possible despatch and secrecy to United States Ford, and having crossed at that place, during the night, to march to Chancellorsville. General Couch reached the latter place in the evening of the 30th, and General Sickles early on the morning of the first of May. On the afternoon of the 30th, General Hooker, after congratulating his troops, in a general order, Appendix No. 4, upon the success which had so far attended his operations, moved his headquarters to the same point, and took command, in person, of the forces there. Pleasanton's cavalry was thrown out on the roads towards Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Court-House, to observe the Confederate forces, and Hooker quietly waited for daylight to push forward his main column.

On this night Stuart had an unexpected and romantic encounter with a part of Pleasanton's cavalry. Having bivouacked Fitz Lee's brigade at Todd's Tavern on its way to Spotsylvania Court-House, he set out, attended only by his staff, for General R. E. Lee's headquarters, to report and receive instructions. He had proceeded but a short distance when he found himself confronted by a regiment of Federal cavalry, who were upon a reconnoissance. Sending back for the Fifth Virginia cavalry, he, leading at the head of his staff, attacked and routed them. Presently a body of Federal cavalry appeared in his rear. Withdrawing the Fifth from the road, he sent back for the whole brigade. When this arrived a spirited encounter took place in the bright moonlight. The silent and desolate spot, the moonlight glancing from the sabres, the excitement of the struggle coming by an unexpected chance to these troopers, far distant from either army, recalled some scene of knightly glory. After several charges, Stuart broke and scattered the force opposed to him. This prevented the Federal reconnoissance from extending to Spotsylvania Court-House, and the capture at that point of a considerable amount of supplies and transportation.

The large cavalry column, under Stoneman, pursued, during the 30th, the plan marked out for it. Averill's division pushed along the Orange Railroad towards Gordonsville, driving back W. H. F. Lee's two regiments, which took position, on the night of the 30th, at Rapidan Station. The two other divis-

ions, commanded by General Stoneman in person, took up their march for Raccoon Ford and Louisa Court-House, from which point they were to be thrown against the Fredericksburg Railroad—Lee's line of communication with Richmond—as well as against the Central Railroad and the canal. Averill's division was intended to occupy the Confederate cavalry, and to mask the movement of the stronger force under Stoneman.

The movements of the Federal troops during this day left General Lee no longer in doubt as to the quarter from which the main attack was to be made, and he determined at once to move out and give battle.

FRIDAY, MAY 1ST.

Anderson, as before stated, had taken up a line perpendicular to the Plank and Turnpike roads, near their junction with the Old Mine Road, and had busily fortified it. McLaws was directed, at midnight, to move his division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, in the direction of Anderson, and to take position on his right. Jackson was ordered to move, at daylight, with three divisions of his corps, in the same direction. He was instructed to take command of all the troops in that part of the field, and upon coming up with the enemy to engage them. General Early was left to defend the works from Hamilton's Crossing to Fredericksburg. The force under his command for this purpose was his own division, Barksdale's brigade of McLaw's division (which was left there be-

cause it had been on picket duty there during the winter), Andrews' battalion of artillery (sixteen guns), and part of the reserve artillery under General Pendleton. It amounted to about eight thousand five hundred muskets and thirty guns. Early's division, with Andrews' artillery, was posted on the right, beginning at Hamilton's Crossing and extending towards Fredericksburg, while Barksdale and the reserve artillery occupied the town and the heights immediately in its rear. McLaws arrived on the right of Anderson's position by daylight, and took his place behind the rifle-pits on Smith's Hill. Jackson, who had put his column in motion at three, A. M., advanced by the Military Road and came up with Anderson at eight, A. M. He at once ordered a general advance. Owen's regiment of cavalry was sent forward to reconnoitre. Anderson followed. The brigades of Posey and Wright, with the greater part of Alexander's battalion of artillery, moved on the Plank Road, while Mahone's brigade and Jordan's battery moved along the Old Turnpike. McLaws' division followed Mahone, and the two other brigades of Anderson, Wilcox's and Perry's, were ordered up from the vicinity of Banks' Ford to join this column. General McLaws took command of this portion of the line. Jackson's Corps moved on the Plank Road in rear of Wright and Posey, and the operations on that road were directed by General Jackson in person.

While Jackson was thus moving his forces forward for attack, Hooker was making disposition for a

similar purpose. Having reconnoitred the position of the Confederate army early in the morning, he ordered a general advance of his troops as follows :

“The Fifth Corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the River road by the most direct route, the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott and Colin runs, the movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at two o'clock, P. M.

“The Twelfth Corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the Plank Road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and the movement to be completed by twelve o'clock, to enable the Eleventh Corps to take its position.

“One division of the Second Corps with one battery, will take a position at Todd's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.

“The other division and batteries of the corps will be massed, out of the road, near Chancellorsville. These dispositions to be made at once.

“The Third Corps will be massed, as fast as it arrives, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States Ford road, excepting one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's Tavern.

“General Pleasanton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.

After the movement commences headquarters will be at Tabernacle Church.

“The Eleventh Corps with its batteries, will be massed on the Plank Road, about one mile in rear of the Twelfth. This movement to be completed at two o'clock.”

The advance began about eleven o'clock in the morning. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps (Meade's) took the River Road, while the other division, under Sykes, took the Old Turnpike, to be followed by the Second Corps. The Twelfth Corps moved on the Plank Road, and was followed by the Eleventh.

The Confederate forces had gone but a short distance on the Old Turnpike, before they met the Federal cavalry in advance of the skirmishers of Sykes' division, which was considerably in advance of the Federal divisions on the other roads. The cavalry were driven back, but soon the Federal troops appeared in force, and the Confederate skirmishers were in turn driven in. McLaws then deployed in line of battle across the Turnpike, placing Semmes to the left of the road, and Mahone, Wofford, and Perry, to the right. Jordan's battery was placed on the Mine Road, and the right of the line extended to cover this approach. Sykes brought up his artillery and, after playing for some time on the Confederate lines, made an attack on Semmes' brigade. This attack, as well as several succeeding ones, was repulsed. Jackson, having been notified of the advanced position of the Federal troops on the Old Turnpike,

pushed forward his troops on the Plank Road, and between the two roads, and threatened Sykes' flank. In the meantime, Kershaw's brigade came up and was thrown out in support of Semmes, and to extend his left; and Wilcox was sent to the right, on the Mine Road, to meet the force reported as advancing in that direction. General Sykes soon found himself overlapped on his flanks, and, unable to cope with the force in front, he was forced to retire. His retreat, however, was effected in good order, and without loss. While these events were transpiring on McLaws' part of the line, the brigades of Posey and Wright, on the Plank Road, having been pushed forward to and beyond the flank of Sykes, became engaged with Slocum, who was advancing on that road. A severe skirmish ensued. The Federal infantry and artillery stoutly resisted Jackson's advance. Ramseur's brigade was brought up to the support of Posey and Wright. The latter was now ordered to make a detour to the left, and by following the track of the unfinished Orange and Fredericksburg Railroad, to turn Slocum's right, and thus force him to retire. This movement had the desired effect. The Federal troops retreated precipitately; their whole line was moved back to the position taken up the night before, and from which they had advanced in the morning. General Hooker states that this withdrawal of his army, and change from the plan of attack designed in the morning, was due to the rapid advance of the Confederates, which brought them into contact with his forces just as they

were debouching from the dense forest which extends for a mile or two to the east of Chancellorsville ; thus causing the apprehension, that, not being able to deploy his troops in time to meet the onset of Jackson, he might be beaten in detail. As the Federal troops retreated, the whole Confederate line advanced, and followed them closely to their breastworks, which were only from a half to one mile from Chancellorsville. "Here," in the words of General Lee, "the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which the position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." By the time that the strength and position of this line had been ascertained, night was coming on, and nothing more could be done. In such a country a night attack was too hazardous an experiment, and, on the main part of the line, nothing more than a skirmish was kept up until dark. On the extreme left, General Wright pushed down the railroad track, without serious opposition, until he reached Welford's Furnace, and came up with General Stuart, who had been guarding the left flank of the Confederate army throughout the day. Here, learning that the Union troops were in force north of the Furnace, toward Chancellorsville, Wright determined to at-

tack them, and develop their forces. Two regiments were thrown forward, supported by two others; the attack was made with vigor, and the Federal advance forced out of the woods, north of the Furnace, to their fortified position on the crest of the hill. This position was found to be defended by an almost impassable abatis, and a heavy mass of artillery. Stuart sent forward his artillery to assist in the attack, but Wright, finding himself unable to make any impression on the Federal lines with his handful of men, withdrew to the Furnace; whence in a short time he was ordered to rejoin his division on the Plank Road. On the right, Wilcox, who, in the advance of the evening, had been stopped by night and the dense forest, in the neighborhood of Duerson's Mill, was brought up on the Turnpike in rear of McLaws; but in the night he was detached to Bank's Ford to oppose a threatened crossing at that point. The Confederate position, on the night of May 1st, extended from the Mine Road on the right, to Welford's or Catharine Furnace on the left. Wickham's Fourth Virginia Cavalry, and Owen's Third Virginia Cavalry, were on the right flank, extending to the River Road, while Stuart, with the remainder of Fitz Lee's Brigade, was on the left, at Catharine Furnace. McLaws occupied the crest on the east of the Big Meadow Swamp, and Anderson continued the line to the left, on the same heights. The Federal line, as shown by the map, extended from the Rappahannock, on their left, to the vicinity of Wilderness Church, a

point two miles west of Chancellorsville, on their right. Through nearly the whole of that distance it ran through that almost impenetrable forest of scrubby oak and pine, which has given to this region the name of the "Wilderness." Once in the wood and it was difficult to know what was transpiring, even at the distance of one hundred yards. Troops could not march any distance through the forest without becoming inextricably confused. The avenues of approach were few and could be easily commanded by artillery. The timber and brushwood afforded the amplest materials for fortifications to protect the attacked and delay the advance of the attacking force. Immediately around the Chancellorsville House, there was a clearing extending between two and three hundred yards towards the Confederate lines. Here were collected a portion of the Federal ambulances and wagons. To the left of this the Federal line had been selected hurriedly, and without care, on the evening of the 30th, and in several places was commanded by the opposite heights. But it was decided that a retention of this line was preferable to any change then, in the face of an enemy. On his right Hooker's line occupied a fine commanding position, running parallel to the Plank Road, on the heights constituting the water-shed between the tributaries of the Rappahannock and the Mattaponi. (Map, No. 3.)

On this line the Federal troops were disposed as follows: The Fifth Corps on the left, next the Twelfth,

then Birney's division of the Third, and lastly, on the right, the Eleventh Corps. Two divisions of the Second, and two divisions of the Third Corps, were kept in reserve. Pleasanton, with his cavalry, was on the right. Hooker's headquarters was at Chancellorsville. This place, now of world-wide fame, consisted of but one large brick house, and derived its importance from being the converging point of many roads. At this house, during the night, the Federal generals met and discussed in council the plan of operations for the morrow. Warren and others favored an attack in full force on the Confederate position. Hooker wished to contract his lines so as to strengthen them, and to wait for the attack. But the officers commanding on the right being confident of the strength of their position, it was determined that the army should wait the advance of Lee on its present line.

SATURDAY, MAY 2D.

Lee and Jackson passed the night under some pine-trees on the left of the Plank Road, just where the Confederate line crossed it. The difficulty of attacking the Federal position in front had induced General Lee to order his cavalry to reconnoitre the right flank of the Union army. During the night they reported favorably to an attack in that direction. At daybreak, General Jackson despatched two of his staff to ascertain if a practicable route existed by which, with speed and secrecy, he might move round the flank of the hostile army. The needed

information was soon obtained. Seated upon two cracker boxes, the debris of an issue of Federal rations the day before, the Confederate leaders held their consultation. With a map before him, General Jackson suggested an entire circuit of the right of the opposing army, and that the attack be made on its rear. Lee inquired with what force he would do this. Jackson replied, "With my whole corps, present." Lee then asked what would be left to him with which to resist an advance of the enemy towards Fredericksburg. "The divisions of Anderson and McLaws," said Jackson. For a moment Lee reflected on the audacity of this plan in the face of Hooker's superior numbers. With less than forty-two thousand muskets, he was in the presence of sixty thousand. To divide his army into two parts, and place the whole Federal force between them, was extremely hazardous. But it was impossible to attack the Federal position in front without terrible loss. The very boldness of the proposed movement, if executed with secrecy and despatch, was an earnest of success. Jackson was directed to carry out the plan.

The orders for the march were immediately given. Rodes, in command of D. H. Hill's division, was placed in advance. A. P. Hill brought up the rear. Turning to the left from the Plank Road a short distance west of Aldrich's, at a point just in rear of the Confederate lines, Jackson marched his column by a circuitous route (Map No. 3) through the dense

forest south of Chancellorsville, often leaving the main roads to avoid the deep mud, and struck the Orange Plank Road four miles west of that place. His movement was for the most part concealed by the dense wood, and by Stuart's cavalry, which was interposed between his column and the Union lines. At the Furnace a road comes in, leading from the Plank Road at Melzi Chancellor's (Dowdall's Tavern). It was upon this road that the Federal troops had advanced the day before when fighting Stuart and Wright. They began to make demonstrations upon it on the morning of the 2d, as Rodes was passing the Furnace, and the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, Colonel Best, was detached from his division to guard it, and prevent a sortie upon the artillery and trains moving in rear of the Confederate column. While Jackson was moving to the right and rear of the Federal army, Lee occupied the attention of the troops in his front by constant skirmishing and frequent demonstrations. He thus succeeded in concealing his designs until they were ready for execution.

The Federal commander, in accordance with the decision of the previous night, awaited within his lines the Confederate attack. At two A. M. he ordered up the First Corps (Reynolds') from Fredericksburg. (Appendix No. 5.) This did not reach him, however, until late at night. During the morning he carefully examined his position in person. While engaged in the reconnoissance, he received information of the movement of Jackson which led

him to suspect its object. Upon his return, therefore, to headquarters, at nine A. M., he despatched an order to the officers commanding on the right of his line, cautioning them to be on their guard against an advance of the enemy on that flank, and directing that means be taken to strengthen that portion of the line to meet such an emergency. (Appendix No. 6.) General Birney, commanding the division of Sickles' Corps which held the line between the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, at the point where the road from Melzi Chancellor's to the Furnace passed through it, from which point he could see Jackson's column as it marched down the hill and crossed Lewis' Creek, reported the passage of a Confederate column in large force. General Sickles went out in person to investigate the truth of this and similar reports. He saw the train of artillery, wagons, and ambulances, which followed in Jackson's rear, passing across his front, and thought it possible that the Confederate army was in full retreat. A battery was pushed forward, which shelled the column from a distance and compelled it to leave the road at the exposed point. It now disappeared from view and, from not again reappearing, induced the belief that the movement, whether of attack or retreat, had been abandoned. Meantime Jackson was pursuing his way with all possible speed through the depth of the forest. A slight circuit concealed the march of his trains from observation. After a while Sickles pushed out a

reconnoissance to learn definitely the condition of affairs. The continued movement was discovered. This determined the Federal commander to push out a strong force to develop the strength and intentions of the enemy. Sickles led out Birney's division for this purpose, on the road to the Furnace, and supported it by another division of his corps, that had been in reserve. This force drove in the Confederate pickets, and coming up with the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, which had been left by Rodes at this point, soon overpowered it, and captured the greater part. The flank of the Confederate column was now exposed and some ambulances and a few prisoners were captured. Fortunately for the Confederates, at this time Colonel J. Thompson Brown's battalion of artillery was still within reach. Putting his guns immediately into position, and supporting them by such detached companies of infantry as were at hand, he succeeded in checking the advance of Sickles, which was being made slowly and with caution. The news of the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia regiment was taken forward to the rear of General Jackson's troops, which were, as it happened, Archer's and Thomas' brigades of A. P. Hill's division. Archer promptly retraced his steps, with these two brigades, to the threatened point. Here he found that Colonel Brown had already checked the dash upon the artillery and wagons, but he nevertheless remained to observe the enemy until the rear of the train had

passed. He then resumed his march to rejoin his division. In the meantime General Anderson was directed to send a brigade to meet this force, and Posey came up, afterwards supported by Wright. They were engaged the whole evening in a sharp conflict with the Federal troops and succeeded in checking their movement. Sickles had however obtained possession of the road over which Jackson had passed, and prepared to follow up and attack him. These preparations, and the delay caused by the stubborn resistance of Posey and Wright, consumed a considerable part of the afternoon. Pleasanton's cavalry was sent for, and joined him. He requested that the third division of his own corps, yet in reserve, might be sent forward. Howard and Slocum were directed to co-operate, and each sent a brigade. While these preparations were in progress, Jackson was already beyond reach. Moving swiftly under the now complete cover of the forest, he reached the Plank Road, crossed it and the Culpeper and Germania roads, and pushed on through the jungle to the Old Turnpike. As he passed around he continually felt the Federal lines. At the Plank Road he halted for a time to reconnoitre the enemy's position. Here, from a commanding hill, he inspected in person the Union lines; and then gave the order to move still farther to the left, that he might deliver his attack completely in rear as well as flank. Fitz Lee's cavalry, however, was ordered forward on the Plank Road, and was sup-

ported by Paxton's brigade of infantry. The mass of Jackson's command continued their flank movement to the Turnpike. While Sickles was making ready to attack him in the neighborhood of the Furnace, he was about to burst like a whirlwind upon Howard's flank and rear. The Turnpike reached, the Confederate column turned down it, toward Chancellorsville. Every precaution was taken to conceal the presence of the troops. Orders were given in a low tone, no guns were permitted to be fired, no cheering was allowed as the General passed along. Passing down the road some distance, Jackson formed his force in three lines of battle perpendicular to the Turnpike, and extending about one mile on each side of it. Rodes occupied the front line, with his brigades in the following order: Iverson's and Rodes' brigades on the left of the road, Doles' and Colquitt's on the right. Two hundred yards in rear, Colston (Commanding Trimble's division) was drawn up; Nicholl's and Jones' brigades on the left of the pike, and Colston's brigade on the right. Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division extended the line on the right in support of Colquitt. Part of A. P. Hill's division, as fast as it arrived, was formed in line, in support of Colston, and the remainder marched in column along the Old Turnpike. Two pieces of Stuart's horse artillery moved along the Old Turnpike with the first line.

Orders were given to the second and third lines to support the first whenever it might be necessary, without waiting specific instructions.

The Eleventh Corps (Howard's), held the right of the Federal army. The works thrown up for its protection were parallel to the Plank and Turnpike roads, and faced southwardly. Steinwehr's division held the left of these works, joining Sickles; Schurz held the centre, and Devens the right. Devens' position was west of the intersection of the Plank and Turnpike roads, near Talley's House. The mass of his force occupied the works parallel to the road, which were formed by deepening the ditch on the side of the road, by earthworks thrown up hastily in the field, by timbers from the log outbuildings, and rails from the fences in the vicinity. But a portion of one of his brigades on the extreme right was thrown across the pike, facing westwardly. These last were protected by but very slight works, and an abatis. Two pieces of artillery were placed on the pike with these troops. These were the only preparations to meet the flank movement of Jackson.

Just before six o'clock, Jackson gave the order to advance. As swiftly as the brushwood would permit, the lines moved forward. The forest was full of game, which, startled from their hiding-places by the unusual presence of man, ran in numbers to and over the Federal lines. Deer leaped over the works at Talley's, and dashed into the wood behind. The Federal troops had, in most cases, their arms stacked and were eating supper. All danger was thought to be over for the night. The startled game gave the first intimation of Jackson's approach. But so little

was it respected or believed, that the suggestion was treated as a jest. Presently the bugles were heard, through which orders were passed along the Confederate lines. This excited still more remark. Ere it had been long discussed, however, there came the sound of a few straggling shots from the skirmishers, then a mighty cheer, and in a moment more Jackson was upon them. A terrible volley from his line of battle was poured among the Union troops ere they could recover from their surprise. Those in line returned a scattered fire, others seized their arms and attempted to form. Officers tried to steady their men and lead them to meet the attack. All was in vain. Rodes rushed over the artillery and infantry of Devens' division which were in position across the turnpike. The mass of Devens' division, at Talley's, taken in the rear by the Confederate fire, broke and rushed at once to the rear in the wildest disorder. The position at Talley's, which was high and commanding, thus fell with hardly any serious resistance. Five pieces of artillery are taken in the works, and a large number of prisoners. The Confederate line does not stop for a moment, but with increasing enthusiasm continues to rush on. Schurz's division does not stay to receive the attack, but joins at once in the rout. On, on pushes Rodes, closely followed by Colston and Hill. Here and there, a Federal regiment takes position, fires a few rounds, and then, as the Confederate masses come up, is scattered to the winds, leaving half its numbers wounded and dying on the field. Like a tornado,

the Confederate lines pass over the ground breaking, crushing, crumbling, Howard's Corps. Artillery, wagons, ambulances, are driven in frantic panic to the rear, and double the confusion. The rout is utter and hopeless. The mass of pursuers and pursued roll on, until the position of Melzi Chancellor's is reached. Here a strong line of works had been constructed across the road, which having a shallow ditch, could be made to face in either direction.

During the time occupied in the dispersion of Devens' and Schurz's divisions, Steinwehr had rapidly changed front, and thrown Buschbeck's brigade into these works. The other brigade of his division had been sent to support Sickles. Some of Schurz's men rally on Buschbeck, and for a short time the Confederate advance is arrested. But Jackson cannot long be held back. Colston's division has eagerly pressed on, and is already commingled with Rodes. Together they charge with a yell; and in a few moments the works are taken. Pell-mell now rush the Eleventh Corps, the last semblance of organization gone, through the forest, towards Chancellorsville. Onward sweep the Confederates in hot pursuit. The arms, knapsacks, and accoutrements of the fugitives fill the woods. Artillery-carriages are to be seen overturned in the narrow roads, or hopelessly jammed in the impenetrable jungle. The wounded and dying, with their groans, fill the forest on every side. The day is rapidly drawing to a close: night comes to add confusion to the scene. It had been impossible

in the broad daylight, owing to the intricacy of the forest, to prevent a commingling of regiments and brigades along the Confederate lines. The confusion thus produced is greatly increased by the darkness. In a brushwood so dense that it is impossible, under favorable circumstances, to see thirty yards in any direction, companies, regiments, brigades, become inextricably intermixed. Colston's division, forming the second line, has already become merged with Rodes. Both move on in one confused mass. The right of the Confederate line soon reaches an abatis, which has been felled to protect the approach to some works on the opposite heights. The troops, already disordered, become still more so among the felled timber. Behind this abatis some troops and artillery have been gathered to make a stand. Rodes finds it impossible to push farther until the lines can be reformed. The right is first halted, and then the whole Confederate line. Rodes sends word at once to Jackson, requesting that the third line (A. P. Hill's division) be sent forward to take the advance, until the first and second can be reformed.

While this was being done, there was a lull in the storm of battle. Jackson had paused for a time in his pursuit; Hooker was attempting to stop and reform his flying legions. So soon as General Hooker had been informed of the rout of the Eleventh Corps, he ordered Berry's division of Sickles' Corps, and a brigade of Couch's Corps, which were the only troops immediately at hand, to move forward rapidly and re-

occupy, if possible, the ground abandoned by the fugitives. He also sent to inform General Sickles, who, having advanced some distance beyond the line of the army, was now in danger of being cut off, of his situation, and instructed him to return, and attack Jackson in flank. When Sickles moved out towards the Furnace, as it could not be used with effect in the dense forest, part of his artillery had been left in the field at Hazel Grove. The same difficulty interfered with the movements of cavalry, and Pleasanton, with two of his regiments and his battery, was ordered back to the point where the artillery had been left. He arrived there just as Howard's Corps was hurrying past, pell-mell, carrying everything with them. Comprehending the danger at once, he hurled one of his regiments, to its own destruction, upon the Confederate line, and seizing the few moments gained, by great exertion, extricated a portion of the artillery from the rout and placed it in position, supported by his cavalry and such stragglers as he could stop. He was favored by the halting of the Confederate advance, which took place just at this time, that A. P. Hill might come up. Soon Pleasanton had from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery ready for action, and when, a few moments afterwards, Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, opened fire from the Confederate batteries on the Plank Road, in order to keep up the panic and prevent the Union troops from reforming, he poured into Jackson's lines a terrific fire of case and canister. This fire wounded

Crutchfield and silenced some of his guns, but did no execution among the infantry. In a short while all was again silent. The troops sent forward by General Hooker, unable to stem or turn the tide of battle, had struggled bravely on through the panic, and were now coming up to Pleasanton's assistance. To go onward and reoccupy the lost ground was out of the question. They could do no more than to try to stop the current of disaster. On the Confederate side, A. P. Hill's division was moving up and deploying in front of Rodes and Colston. A forward movement had been ordered to take place so soon as this should be completed.

General Jackson, while waiting for Hill, rode forward to reconnoitre. He was accompanied by a portion of his staff and couriers, and by several other officers. When he had ridden some distance beyond the pickets, and was near the Van Wert house, some one remarked to him, "General, you should not expose yourself so much," he replied, "There is no danger, the enemy is routed. Go back and tell General Hill to press on." He was now in close proximity to the Federal lines, and upon the advance of their pickets, he turned and rode with his escort towards his own troops. The skirmishers on both sides were firing and as Jackson approached his lines, he with his escort was mistaken for Federal cavalry, and received a volley from the Confederate line of battle. Several of the party fell killed and wounded. The General turned to his left, and entering the thicket continued

to go on towards his troops. A moment more, and his party, still mistaken for Federal cavalry, were fired into by a brigade on the south of the road, and at a distance of not more than thirty or forty yards. Jackson received three balls, one in the right hand, and two in the left arm, one of which shattered the bone two inches below the shoulder, and severed the artery. Half his escort including Captain Boswell, of his staff, were killed and wounded. His horse, frightened by the fire, and now without guidance, turned and rushed towards the Federal lines. As he was thus carried through the brushwood, he was struck by the overhanging limbs, and at one time nearly unhorsed by a bough, which bore him backward and tore off his cap. Recovering himself, he managed to check his horse with his bleeding hand, and to turn it into the Plank Road. Here Captain Wilbourn of his staff, seized the bridle and quieted the frightened animal. The General now attempted to move his broken arm, to ascertain the extent of the injury. This caused so much pain that he fell exhausted and bleeding into the arms of Captain Wilbourn, and was borne to the road-side and laid under a tree. Captain Wilbourn despatched his only companion at the moment, for a surgeon ; while he attempted to locate the wound and stanch the blood. While thus engaged, General Hill rode up with his staff, and hearing of the misfortune, threw himself from his horse, and hurried to the side of the wounded leader. Seeing the rapid flow of blood, he bandaged the arm

above the wound. Though so much exhausted by pain and loss of blood, no time was to be lost in removing Jackson. The Federal line was near by, and advancing. Two Federal pickets were captured within a few yards of him by one of General Hill's escort. Two pieces of artillery had been advanced on the Plank Road, and were going into position, not one hundred yards off. The General having been raised from the ground was supported for a few steps by Captain Leigh, and then was placed upon a litter. He had been carried but a little way in this manner, when the Federal artillery opened, and a perfect storm of canister swept down the road. The General's horse, which was being led, broke away and dashed into the Confederate lines. The road was cleared in a few moments of everything, except the party bearing the wounded chieftain. In another moment one of the litter-bearers was struck dead, and Captain Leigh caught the falling litter. They were compelled to set it down. The General attempted to rise, but was made by Lieut. Smith, his aid, to lie down. The whole party lay flat on the ground for several minutes, while the canister tore over and past them. The direction of the Federal fire changed, in part to the left. The General was assisted to rise, and leaning on his aids, Lieutenants Smith and Morrison, turned slowly into the woods on the right of the road. Here they soon came upon the Confederate line of battle, occupied at this point by Pender's brigade of A. P. Hill's division. Jackson

had instructed his attendants, from the first, to conceal his fall from the soldiers. As they passed through, and over the troops, who were for the most part lying down to avoid the terrible artillery fire; to the numerous inquiries of "Whom have you there?" the answer was returned, "A Confederate officer." General Pender, however, who met the party at this moment, recognized Jackson, and after expressing his deep concern at the misfortunes, said, "The troops have suffered by the enemy's artillery, and are somewhat disordered, I fear we cannot maintain our position here." The exhausted and fainting soldier for a moment recovered his former fire, as raising his head he replied, in his usual quick, decided tone, "You must hold your ground, General Pender, you must hold your ground, sir." A little after, he asked to be allowed to sit down and rest. The firing being still too heavy to admit of this, with safety, he was again placed upon the litter and carried forward as rapidly as the dense tangled brush would admit. One of the bearers stumbled and fell, and this time the General was thrown from the litter upon his wounded arm. For the first time a groan escaped him. Again he was placed upon the litter, the party turned from the wood into the road, and carried him some distance to the rear, until they came up with an ambulance. Here Dr. McGuire met them, and having readjusted the bandage, so as to more completely stop the flow of blood, placed him in the ambulance, which already contained Colonel Crutchfield, and

accompanied them to the hospital at Wilderness Tavern.

During this time, A. P. Hill's division had taken the front, and Rodes and Colston withdrew their troops to Melzi Chancellor's, where was the first open space in which they might be reformed. Jones' brigade, of Colston's division, was detached to guard a road coming in from the direction of the Furnace, on the Confederate flank, and Colquitt's brigade, of Rodes' division, was assigned to a similar duty, on a road parallel to that one, and coming in farther to the west. Paxton's brigade, which had advanced on the Plank Road in the evening, and had been kept in reserve, now occupied a portion of the intrenchments at Melzi Chancellor's. Rodes formed his line in connection with Paxton, while Colston drew up his troops, in line, a short distance in front of Rodes.

In the severe artillery fire under which Jackson had been borne within his lines, General A. P. Hill, the officer next in rank, received a severe contusion from a piece of shell, and was disabled from command. Remaining on a litter, near the line of battle, he directed that Major-General Stuart should be sent for, while, in the mean time, the command of the corps devolved upon Brigadier-General Rodes. Late in the evening, Stuart, finding it impossible to use his command to much purpose in the front, where the battle was progressing, because of the difficulty of manœuvring cavalry in the forest, had been detached by General Jackson, with his cavalry and a regiment of

infantry, to take and hold the Elley's Ford Road. The road had been reached, and Stuart had pushed on to the vicinity of the ford, and was preparing to dash at the camps and troops assembled there, when the messenger from General Hill recalled him, to assume command of Jackson's Corps.

Meanwhile Rodes, after consultation, decided that it was inadvisable, under the circumstances, to carry out the intention of pushing the attack. The darkness, which, notwithstanding the moonlight, shrouded the dense forest just bursting into leaf, the nature of the ground, and, more than all, the fall of Jackson, determined him to remain in his present position, and not to renew the attack until daylight. General Stuart, upon his arrival, concurred in this determination, and devoted himself during the night to getting troops and artillery into position for the morning. No other course could with prudence be pursued. Stuart came to the command late at night, and entirely unacquainted with the ground and the location of the troops. In answer to an application to General Jackson, for instructions, he had been directed to use his own judgment. Assisted by Colonel Alexander of the artillery, he spent the whole night in visiting every part of the line, and locating his troops for the action of the morrow. (Map No. 4.) Hill's division, the advance, was placed in position so as to be able to renew the attack at the earliest possible moment, and at the same time, to resist the night attacks of the enemy. For this latter purpose, the right of the

line was thrown back nearly parallel to the Plank Road, that its front and not its flank might be presented to Sickles. One attack had already been made in front, and the heavy artillery fire that accompanied it, had produced some confusion. It was soon repulsed, however, and quiet once more rested on the field.

General Sickles, returning from the Furnace, had now reached his former line of breastworks near Hazel Grove; and his corps was being deployed in support of Pleasanton and the artillery which had been served so well. Without difficulty he reoccupied a portion of the Federal works on the right of the Confederate line, from which Hill's troops had been withdrawn. He determined to go farther, and attempt the recapture of some of the lost positions. Several attacks were made by him during this night of confusion and dismay, when friend and foe were often intermingled and mistaken, when brigades of the same division often fired at each other, and often at nothing at all.

No other result flowed from these attacks, however, than the din of battle, to be added to the groans of the wounded and dying. Sickles was unable to make any considerable progress, and finally took up his position and entrenched it, on the high ground between Fairview and the Confederate lines in advance of Melzi Chancellor's.

When Jackson's guns had announced, in the evening, his attack, General Lee ordered all the artillery

on his right wing to open, and made continual demonstrations upon the Federal line, to prevent the troops in his front from being sent against Jackson. Severe skirmishing was kept up until after dark, which occupied the attention of the Union troops, and prevented Slocum from changing position.

The disaster of this evening rendered new dispositions necessary on the part of the Federal commander. Instead of falling upon Lee's flank in the position at Fredericksburg, Lee had turned his flank and routed it. Instead of surprising, he had been the party surprised. While he doubted whether the Confederate army was not in full retreat on Richmond and Gordonsville, more than half of that army had descended like a tornado on his right wing and rear. Instead of cutting Lee off from his base, his own communications with the north bank of the Rappahannock had been imperilled. From the attacking party he had been converted into the attacked. Instead of delivering, he had received, a staggering blow. The heights at Talley's overlooked the whole of the right of his line, and were the key to his position. These had been lost, and an entire corps demolished. Panic had seized his troops, and the loss of Jackson alone had probably prevented the rout from extending to and beyond Chancellorsville. Night, and the fall of the Confederate leader, had given him respite at the most critical moment; had given an opportunity to stay the fast-spreading panic; to extricate Sickles from his very precarious situation; to hurry up his

reserves to the scene of action ; to change the front of his army, to receive the Confederate attack ; to bring up Reynolds' Corps, which was on its way from Sedgwick to join him. With characteristic energy the new dispositions were made. A new line of battle was selected on the heights between Fairview and Melzi Chancellor's, a short distance to the west of Chancellorsville, and strengthened during the night. On the right the line was bent back parallel to the Plank Road, to secure that flank. At Fairview, in the rear of this line, more than thirty pieces of artillery, protected by intrenchments, were massed. Sickles, connecting with Slocum on his left, occupied this line to the Plank Road and across it. On his right was a portion of the Second Corps, and on the right of all, behind breastworks thrown up along the Elley's Ford Road, and separated by an interval from the others, was the First Corps, under Reynolds. On the left of the Federal army, facing towards Fredericksburg, Meade joined Slocum. On the extreme left the remains of Howard's Corps were ordered to take position. Thus disposed, the Federal army was ready to receive the attack, and, if opportunity offered, to hurl a crushing force upon the Confederate left wing. The arrival of Reynolds had more than replaced the loss of the Eleventh Corps. Hooker still had sixty thousand infantry, available, at Chancellorsville. The combined forces of Lee and Jackson, at that point, were not over forty thousand, after the losses of the 1st and 2d of May. With such a pre-

ponderance of force, victory was still within the grasp of the Federal commander. A decided repulse of Jackson might yet turn the scale. Any advantage gained could be followed up with overwhelming effect. The chances in his favor were much increased when Sedgwick was taken into the calculation. He, with thirty thousand splendid troops, was yet opposite Fredericksburg. The Confederate lines at that place were held by Early, with but eight thousand five hundred infantry and two or three battalions of artillery. General Hooker knew Early's strength. What was to prevent Sedgwick from crossing at Fredericksburg, pushing Early out of his way, and falling upon Lee's rear, who, with sixteen thousand muskets, held the right of the Confederate lines. The distance was but ten miles. If Early should fall back and unite with Lee, their united force was inferior to Sedgwick's; and if they attempted to hold their position, might be attacked at the same time by Sedgwick, and by Hooker with half the forces at Chancellorsville. Sixty thousand men might thus be thrown on Lee and Early, while Jackson's Corps was held in check by thirty thousand more. This danger would most probably force Lee to retire and unite with Jackson. The direct line to Richmond would thus be uncovered, and the Confederate army, severed from its depôts, be thrown back on Gordonsville.

Orders were sent early in the night to Sedgwick, in accordance with this design. He had been engaged, during the 1st and 2d, in making demonstrations, and

been instructed, in case the Confederate forces in his front retreated, to pursue with vigor towards Richmond. In accordance with these instructions, he had thrown his force over the river, at Franklin's Crossing, on the evening of the 2d. At 9 p. m. the following order was sent by General Hooker :

"The Major-General commanding directs that you cross the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville Road, until you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road.

"You will leave all your trains behind except pack-trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the General at daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between you and the Major-General commanding, he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail."

Soon after General Warren, the senior engineer officer with General Hooker, was despatched, with especial instructions, to urge Sedgwick forward and to put him in full possession of the position and plans of the Federal commander-in-chief. At midnight the following was sent. Gibbon, of the Second Corps, had been already instructed to cross at Fredericksburg :

"From the statements brought by General Hooker's aid, it seems to be of vital importance that you should

fall upon Lee's rear with crushing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance to one that will do all that the urgency of the case requires.

(Signed) "DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,
"Major-General and Chief of Staff."

Having taken these measures to insure the co-operation of Sedgwick early on the morrow, Hooker waited until daylight should once more reveal the scene of action, and develop the designs of his opponent.

The Confederate forces were drawn up, during the night (Map No. 4), in three lines of battle. Hill's division in advance, was posted, mainly on the right of the Plank Road, in the following order: Archer's brigade on the right, McGowan's, Lane's, Pender's, and Thomas' extending in order to the left. Pender and Thomas were on the left of the road. Heth's brigade was in reserve, supporting Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan had been thrown back, obliquely to the road, so as to face Sickles. The remainder of the line was perpendicular to it. Colston's division constituted the second line, and Rodes' the third. A heavy mass of artillery was concentrated on the ridge occupied by the right of the corps, and near Melzi Chancellor's. Such was the disposition of the Confederate left wing. One of Jackson's engineers, making a wide detour to avoid Sickles' scouts and pickets, reached General Lee (at the same point where he had spent Friday night) before day, and informed

him of the condition of affairs, and the location of the Second Corps. He sent orders to General Stuart to incline to the right, while he moved Anderson and McLaws to the left, to form a junction of his wings. On the right of the Confederate army dispositions were made for this purpose. McLaws' division was extended from the Plank Road towards the right, while Anderson, whose right wing rested on the Plank Road, was directed to extend his troops to the left, towards the Furnace, and, swinging round on the Federal position, to connect with Jackson's Corps, and thus unite the heretofore divided army.

SUNDAY, MAY 3D.

At dawn, just as rations were about being issued, Archer and McGowan were ordered to move forward, so as to straighten the line. They became almost immediately engaged, and General Stuart, without waiting further, ordered the whole corps to the attack. Soon the battle became general along the whole of his line. The Confederate artillery, which had been placed in position during the night by Colonel Alexander, opened with vigor, and under cover of it, a general assault was made. The first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in the night and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been unremittingly employed in its construction. A vast number of trees had been felled, and formed into a heavy rampart.

all approach to which was rendered extremely difficult by an abatis of limbs and brushwood. On the south side of the road this line is situated upon a ridge, on the Chancellorsville side of Lewis' Creek, one of the numerous head waters of the Mattaponi. It is intersected by the smaller branches of this creek, and the ravines in which they run. These ravines extended behind the Federal lines, almost to the Plank Road, and afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In the morning Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the elevated plateau at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except Fairview, in the vicinity. On the north of the Plank Road, the ground is more level. The line there crossed several small branches, the origin of some small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side are not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line the ground falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis' Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an abrupt slope to the Fairview Hill, which rises directly from it on the eastern side. From the front line to the creek, extends, on both sides of the road, a dense forest. From the latter point to the Fairview Heights, and to Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road the country is cleared. This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs, from near Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the line of works occupied by Slocum. It extends some little distance on the north of the road.

Behind the front line of works there were some defences, in the valley near the creek, not constituting a connecting line, however, and these in turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered the Fairview Heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the first.

As Archer and McGowan moved forward, the former became engaged with that portion of the Federal troops, which, thrown forward obliquely at Hazel Grove, threatened the Confederate flank; while McGowan moved parallel to the Plank Road. Archer drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and finding him in position at Hazel Grove, charged, and took four pieces of artillery. This movement separated him from McGowan on his left, and he found himself unsupported on either flank. He continued onward, however, and attacked a strong line of Federal infantry, drawn up in rear of Hazel Grove. Here he was repulsed, and fell back to the captured pieces, where he remained until reinforced. This high and commanding plateau offered an excellent position for artillery, and Stuart at once massed thirty pieces there, under Walker, which played a very effective part in the subsequent operations.

While these events were transpiring on the extreme right of Jackson's Corps, the centre and left had, after a sharp contest, driven the enemy from the first line of works. Leaping the works, they continued to push back the masses of his infantry, under a galling fire from his batteries on the Fairview ridge. McGowan

and Lane penetrated some distance in this way, when the enemy, perceiving the gap between the former and Archer, massed in the opening, and threatened McGowan's flank and rear. For some time an unequal contest was maintained. Then McGowan was forced back to the captured works. Lane's and Heth's brigades were compelled to follow, after having suffered severely from the Federal artillery. On the left of the road, Pender and Thomas had, after capturing the works in their front, driven the Federal line through the thick brushwood upon its supports, when finding themselves exposed, by the repulse of the attack on the right of the road, they were in turn forced to retire. Again they advanced and drove back the enemy, and again were they repulsed by the Federal troops. These now attacked their left in force. A strong body of infantry, supported by artillery, moved to the left of the Confederate line, and threatened its flank and rear. At this time the second and third Confederate lines of battle pressed forward to the support of the first. On the left of the Plank Road came Nicholls' brigade, of Colston's division, and Iverson's and Rodes' brigade of Rodes' division. Iverson threw out a portion of his command, which, with Nicholls and Thomas, met the flank attack, and held the enemy in check. The remainder, with Rodes' brigade, pressed to the front to reinforce Pender. Pender ordered a charge with all the troops now on his line. Rodes led his old brigade over the first works in person. The

wave of battle moved forward. Back were driven the Federal lines. Onward rushed the Confederates, down the declivity, over the works and abatis near its base, across the little stream in the valley, and up the heights at Fairview, crowned by the Federal works and artillery.

The storm of lead and canister that met them, did not stop their progress. A moment more and Colonel Hall, with part of Rodes' brigade, and Colonel Christie, with part of Iverson's reached the works, and dashing into them, drove the enemy from their guns. For a few minutes, a fierce struggle ensued. In the mean time, the troops sent forward by Pender, on the left of Hall and Christie, raked by an enfilade fire from the Federal troops pressing on the flank and firmly resisted by the line in front had been driven back. The Union troops now quickly concentrated their fire on the forces in the works, and threatened to surround them. Hall and Christie were forced back with heavy loss, and once more the Confederate line halted at the works captured early in the morning.

On the extreme left flank the Federal troops now pushed the attack with renewed vigor. Iverson, though aided by a portion of Rodes' brigade, in addition to Nicholls' and Thomas', was severely pressed. Reinforcements were urgently demanded, and Colquitt's brigade was sent for, and ordered up.

While this fierce contest was progressing on his flank, Rodes ordered the works at Fairview again

to be stormed. Again his line moved forward, again Hill reached the works and for a moment held the guns, and again, with the repulse of the troops on his left, was he forced to retire. The Federal troops were still pressing the flank, but Colquitt's brigade had now gotten up, and soon turned the scale of battle there. The Union forces were driven back with heavy loss to their works on the Elley's Ford Road, and did not renew the attack in that quarter.

While the battle was thus raging, with varied success, on the left of the road, a contest, not less stubborn and sanguinary, was progressing to the right of it. The second line, composed on that part of the field, of Colston's and Jones' brigades, soon joined by Paxton's; and the third line, comprising Ramseur's and Doles' brigades had pressed forward, and taken the place of the first. This, they found in the works captured by the first charge of the morning. Passing over these fortifications, they vigorously attacked the enemy, and steadily forced him back. Jones supported McGowan, and together with Colston, aided in checking the effort made to turn the right flank of Jackson's Corps. Doles and Ramseur pushed straight on, and soon were hotly engaged in front. Protected by felled timber, and taking advantage of the ravines, which intersected this part of the field, the flower of Sickles' Corps long and stoutly resisted the Confederate advance. The batteries at Fairview poured a ceaseless storm of shell and case into the attacking column. Under this galling fire the Con-

federate troops charged the abatis, and forced its brave defenders to retire. Every inch of ground was disputed. Slowly and sullenly did the Federal troops give way, until they reached the works at Fairview. Here for a time they maintained their ground. Doles moved to the right under cover of a hill which protected him from the Federal batteries, and up a ravine formed by the little branch coming from the rear of Fairview, and emerged on the flank of the Fairview line of works, and in the rear of the line facing to the south, and held by Slocum against Anderson. Here he carried the position in his front and deployed upon the plain of Chancellorsville. He was at once exposed at short range to the guns in battery immediately around the Chancellorsville House, and attacked in rear by Slocum's troops. No support was within reach. It was impossible to go farther. Changing the front of a portion of his command, he repulsed the attack in rear, and withdrew to his former position. Ramseur maintained the stubborn conflict in front of the main fortifications. The interval left by Doles exposed his right, but he faced a portion of his brigade to protect it. Reinforcements were called for, repeatedly, but for some time could not be obtained. His flank was sorely pressed, and he was fast being exhausted by the conflict, when Paxton's ("Stonewall") brigade came up on the right. Once more the spirit of Jackson seemed to animate his troops. Driving back the attack on Ramseur's right, the brigade charged the Federal line, and

sweeping to the left, carried again, the works, twice carried by Hall before. Another short, sharp, deadly struggle, the tide turned again, and the Confederates were forced to abandon the captured works, though now the enemy was not able to pursue.

Jackson's artillery had been moved forward as the infantry advanced, and now poured an effective fire into the Federal lines. Colonel H. P. Jones, with ten guns, near the Plank Road, had for some time kept up a vigorous shelling of the Fairview works. Now, a mass of artillery on the high ground about Hazel Grove, under Walker, Carter, and Pegram, was trained to bear on the same point. The position was favorable, and the Federal lines suffered severely. Farther to the right Hardaway, with the artillery attached to Anderson's division, poured an oblique fire into Slocum's line, which was also subjected to a terrible enfilade fire from the plateau at Hazel Grove. The co-operation of McLaws and Anderson now became effective. While the former engaged the left of the Union army and prevented a transfer of forces, the latter moved from the Plank Road into position, through the dense forest, and attacked Slocum in front, gradually stretching to the left and closing in upon the Federal position. Anderson at last united with Jackson. With the two wings of his army thus connected, General Lee pressed simultaneously all parts of the Union line. Sickles, who had borne the brunt of the battle at Fairview, and in front of it, was exhausted, and no relief was sent in answer to

his appeal. Slocum's works, enfiladed by the Confederate position at Hazel Grove, were untenable. Meade was occupied by McLaws. Reynolds lay almost inactive upon the extreme right, and, from some unknown cause, hardly participated in the battle at all. Couch was engaged to some extent on the right of Sickles. Howard was not available after the preceding day.

General Hooker had been disabled in the morning, by a severe contusion from a column of the Chancellorsville House, thrown against him by a cannon shot. For a space of one or two hours he was unable to command. General Couch exercised his functions. This change of commanders, in the very crisis, as it were, of a great battle, caused a loss of energy and co-operation.

The Confederate attack, now pressed at all points, could no longer be withstood. Defeated in his attempts to turn the Confederate left, holding his centre at Fairview with shattered and wavering forces, with Slocum retiring from the works facing to the South, and the troops still farther to the left pressed by McLaws, the Federal Commander was forced to abandon his position, and with it the Plank Road, by which the advance of Sedgwick was expected. In confusion, and under a most galling fire which swept the plains of Chancellorsville in every direction, the Federal troops gave way and retired to the line of works running along the roads to Elley's and United States' fords, and which had its apex at Bullock's House.

Anderson vigorously pressed the retiring troops, and McLaws closing in from the east, a considerable number of prisoners was captured by them at the Chancellorsville House. At ten, A. M., the Confederate forces held full possession of the field of battle.

Thus, after a fierce and determined struggle of six hours' duration, General Lee had defeated his opponent and driven his shattered forces from their position. The resistance of the Federal army had been stubborn. Numbers, weight of artillery, and strength of position, had been in its favor. Against it told heavily the loss of morale due to the disaster of the previous day.

With the capture of Chancellorsville, the current of victory set decisively in favor of the Confederates. Lee's forces were now united, while Hooker's were divided. The Confederate army was now interposed between the two wings of the Federal army. Sedgwick had not arrived. Hooker had been forced from the position which rendered a junction with him possible. So crippled was the Union army at Chancellorsville, that Lee was free either to push his victory, there, farther, and force it to the Rappahannock, or to turn upon Sedgwick with overwhelming power. The plans of the Federal Commander-in-Chief had been rendered abortive by the failure of Sedgwick. Without one third of his army, he had been compelled to give battle, and had lost. Had the thirty thousand men at Fredericksburg been present the result might have been different. Now he was forced to

look, not to the defeat of Lee, but to the safety of his own troops.

The Confederate army deployed upon the plateau at Chancellorsville. Here regiments, brigades, and divisions, which had become separated in many instances, in the confusion of battle, and by the dense brushwood, were reunited. A line of battle was formed along the Plank Road, west of Chancellorsville, and extending down the Old Turnpike to the east of that place. Rodes, with his right resting at Chancellorsville, extended up the Plank Road. To his left was Pender, with half of A. P. Hill's division, which stretched across the road in conformity to the Federal lines. To the east of Chancellorsville was Colston, on whose right were, at first, Anderson and McLaws. When these divisions were soon after detached, Heth, with three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, took their place.

The Federal army was thus disposed in its new position. Slocum's and Howard's corps held the left of the line extending towards Scott's Dam. Sickles and Couch were massed with a large number of pieces of artillery at Bullock's House, where a commanding plateau formed the vertex and key of the Federal position. The right of the line was held by Meade and Reynolds, and ran along the Elley's Ford Road towards the mouth of Hunting Run. This position had been strongly fortified and presented but few assailable points.

Quiet rested on the battle-field, interrupted only by

a scene which induced a feeling of horror. In the forest on the north side of the Plank Road, where the contest on the Confederate left had taken place, a fire broke out and spread rapidly through the dry leaves and branches. The wood was filled with the dead and wounded of both armies, and many of the latter it was found impossible to remove in time to save them from the fire. The sight of the crackling flames and dense suffocating smoke, caused a shudder in many a breast which had borne unmoved the fullest fury of the morning's battle.

General Lee determined to push his advantage and attack the Federal army in its new fortifications. His troops and artillery were ordered into position for this purpose, and reconnoissances made of the Federal line. The preparations were nearly completed, and the advance about to be ordered, when a despatch informed him of the capture of Marye's Hill, and the advance of Sedgwick.

In consequence of this, operations were suspended at Chancellorsville, and the attention of the Confederate leader was turned to the movements of the left wing of the Union army. It is now time to describe those movements.

As already stated, General Sedgwick had crossed to the south side of the Rappahannock, at Franklin's, on the evening of the 2d. His movement had been in consequence of orders, which, from some delay, did not reach him until late in the day. (Appendix No. 7.) Throwing out his advance towards

Hamilton's Crossing, a sharp skirmish was maintained for some time with a portion of Hays' brigade of Early's division. Night was already at hand and no general advance was attempted. It was in this position that, at eleven, P. M., Sedgwick received the order already given to march without delay on Chancellorsville. Leaving one division to cover his rear, and skirmish with the forces in his front, he moved his other two divisions up the river towards Fredericksburg. (Map No. 4.) Delays however took place, and though General Warren arrived at two, A. M., to hasten forward the movement, it was daylight when the head of the Federal column entered the town, but three miles from Franklin's Crossing. General Gibbon with his division of the Second Corps, having laid pontoons at the town, soon after entered it from the north side of the river.

To meet this movement, Barksdale distributed his brigade, consisting of about fourteen hundred men, as follows: Seven companies, of the Twenty-first Mississippi regiment, were posted between the Marye House and the Plank Road. The three remaining companies of the Twenty-first and the Eighteenth Mississippi regiment occupied the Telegraph Road at the foot of Marye's Hill. His other two regiments were on the hills farther to the right, and in the vicinity of Howison's House. Four pieces of General Pendleton's artillery were placed to the right of the Marye House, and two to the left; while several batteries were placed on Lee's Hill and near Howison's.

Early, having been informed that the Federal troops occupied Fredericksburg in force, sent Hays' brigade to reinforce Barksdale. One of his regiments was placed in position to cover Barksdale's right. The remainder of the brigade took possession of the ridge, which ends with Taylor's Hill, above the town.

So soon as the advance division (Newton's) of Sedgwick's Corps, had entered the town, four regiments were sent forward to attack the Confederate line in rear of it. Once more the Federal troops advanced over the ground made famous by the attack of Sumner's Corps on the thirteenth of December. And now, as then, the Confederates lay patiently in wait behind the stone wall and rifle pits, from which destruction had sped to the Irish brigade and disaster to Burnside. The Federal line advanced within twenty yards, where it received the fire which had been reserved until this moment. The batteries on the hill and the infantry at the foot of it opened simultaneously. The attacking column was broken and retired with loss to the town. General Sedgwick now determined to turn the Confederate position. Howe, with the rear division of his corps, was ordered to advance, on the left of Hazel Run, against the opposing line, and Gibbon, who had just crossed over, was ordered to move up the river and turn the Confederate left. Howe, upon advancing, found the works in his front occupied and extending beyond his left, while the character of the stream deterred him from moving to the right, and attacking in flank the works

at Marye's. Above Fredericksburg greater obstacles were encountered. At the foot of Taylor's Hill a canal is cut out from the river, which, running along the base of the ridge, supplies the water for mills and factories in the town. The bridges over this canal having been destroyed, it formed an excellent barrier against the advance of troops. The Confederates occupied the hills overlooking it with a few pickets from Wilcox's brigade near Taylor's House, while Hays' brigade was around Stansbury's House. Gibbon advanced up the River Road, but was stopped by the canal. Information of his approach was sent to General Wilcox who had been guarding Bank's Ford, but was now preparing to march to join the main army at Chancellorsville. He hastened down in person and collecting the men at hand, and running two pieces of artillery into position on the crest of Taylor's Hill, opened fire. He was seconded by Hays. The Federal troops ceased to advance and sheltered themselves in the cuts of the road.

Gibbon having reported the impracticability of the Confederate position here, and Howe having been unable to affect anything by manœuvring in his front, no alternative was left to Sedgwick, but to storm the works. For this purpose, he directed General Newton, whose division occupied the town, to send forward two storming parties against Marye's Hill and the contiguous works; while General Howe was ordered to make an attack up Hazel Run on the second line of heights. His artillery had been play-

ing during the whole morning from both sides of the river upon the Confederate lines. These lines occupied two ridges, the first of which, nearest the town, is Marye's Hill and its prolongations. In rear, and to the right of this runs another and higher ridge, which includes Lee's Hill, and on which is Howison's House. Newton was to attack the former, and Howe the latter. Two columns of attack from Newton's division were formed on the edge of the town ; the right one commanded by Colonel Spear, Sixty-first Pennsylvania, the left by Colonel Johns, Seventh Massachusetts. The right-hand column consisted of the Sixty-first Pennsylvania, and Forty-third New York, supported by the Sixty-seventh New York and Eighty-second Pennsylvania. The left was composed of the Seventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth New York. The columns moved up the Plank Road and to the right of it. At the same time Colonel Burnham with four regiments moved in line of battle to the left of the Plank Road, directly against the rifle pits at the base of Marye's Hill. The works against which these troops moved were held by two regiments supported by six pieces of artillery. The Federal columns advanced to within three hundred yards, when Barksdale opened on them with canister. Still they pushed on until at close musket range, they received a heavy fire from the Confederate infantry behind the stone wall. Under this the heads of the columns reeled, staggered, and broke. Quickly were they rallied and again led to the attack. Once more was Johns repulsed and driven

from the field. A flag of truce was now sent to the Confederate lines to secure the wounded. The Federal commanders having been informed, upon the return of the officers bearing the flag, of the handful of men by whom they had been resisted, again went forward to the charge. Right, left, and centre, under Spear, Burnham, and Johns, rushed forward to the works. The Confederates found themselves violently assaulted at every point by superior numbers, but made a desperate resistance. They were unable to check effectually the onset, and though Spear fell dead, and Johns severely wounded in the charge, the Union troops dashed up to and over the works. The struggle only ceased within the fortifications, when the brave Mississippians were completely overpowered, and the greater portion killed or captured. It was now eleven, A. M. So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's Hill, that Hays and Wilcox, to whom application had been made for succor, had not time to march troops from Taylor's and Stansbury's to Barksdale's aid.

While these events were transpiring, Howe was making an attack, to the left of Hazel Run. The Confederate skirmishers then occupied the line of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, covering themselves by the railroad embankment, and some rifle-pits. Their artillery and main line of infantry, consisting of one of Hays' and two of Barksdale's regiments, occupied Lee's Hill and those adjacent. Howe sent forward two attacking columns ;

the main one consisting of six regiments, in two lines of battle, on the right near the run ; the other of three regiments farther to the left. A third column was sent still farther to the left, to take the Confederate works in rear, and co-operate with the others when they should have carried what was in front. The Confederate skirmishers were dislodged from the railroad, and the Federal troops advanced over the plain intervening between the road and the heights, under a heavy artillery fire. Three regiments of the principal column soon deflected to the right, became separated from the others, and crossing the creek, united in the attack on Marye's Hill. The remainder pushed forward to the heights in front, and after a severe contest, obtained a footing on Lee's Hill. The capture of Marye's, and the approach of Howe's troops on the Confederate right, rendered this position, for them, no longer tenable. The remnants of the two regiments from below coming up, the Confederates retreated on the Telegraph Road, contesting every inch of ground. Early hurried up with the troops from the extreme right, towards Hamilton's Crossing, and a stop was put to the Federal advance. Eight pieces of artillery were lost by the Confederates in this affair, part being taken on Marye's Heights, and part by Howe. By this disaster the Confederate forces were cut in two, and Wilcox's brigade and the greater part of Hays' were left on the north of the Plank Road. Hays retreated parallel to the road, and marching round the head of the Federal advance soon

rejoined Early. A portion of Gordon's brigade having come up from the right, Early now formed a line of battle with it, and the troops of Hays across the Telegraph Road at Cox's House, two miles in rear of Lee's Hill. Sedgwick, however, did not advance far upon the Telegraph Road. His destination was Chancellorsville, and he prepared to press forward in that direction.

Wilcox, cut off by the Federal advance from communication with the Confederate troops on the right, instead of following Hays and rejoining them by a circuit, determined to delay the progress of the enemy on the Plank Road, and retire towards Chancellorsville. He drew up his brigade in line on the ridge from Stansbury's to Guest's, and placing four pieces of artillery in position, shelled and skirmished with the Federal troops on Marye's and the adjacent heights. The Federals were slow in moving, and this encouraged him to continue a spirited resistance. Meanwhile Sedgwick had brought Brooks' division from the rear and placed it in front, followed by Newton's, and then by Howe's. It was nearly three, P. M., five hours after Hooker had been driven from his works at Chancellorsville, when the Sixth Corps moved out in this order on the Plank Road. Gibbon was sent back with his division to hold the town and the bridges.

Wilcox continued to annoy the Federal troops and to resist their advance, until they had pushed, in strong force, so far up the Plank Road as to threaten

to surround him. Then, withdrawing his artillery and skirmishers, he moved to the River Road, half a mile in rear of Taylor's House. The slowness and caution with which the Union troops advanced, encouraged Wilcox to move back again to the Plank Road, and interposing between them and Chancellorsville, to retard their movements until reinforcements could arrive. He had with him forty or fifty cavalry under Major Collins of the Third Virginia Regiment. These he despatched at once to the Plank Road, and ordered them to dismount in the pines a little in rear of Downman's House, and deploy as skirmishers on both sides of the road. His brigade and artillery were then moved to Salem Church. After his arrival there, finding an eligible position near the toll-gate, Wilcox advanced his troops to that point, and placed two rifled pieces in the road. Here he waited the advance of Sedgwick who soon came on, pushing Collins and the cavalry skirmishers before him. Wilcox threw forward some infantry skirmishers and opened his artillery on the Federal line. He received a brisk shelling in return. This fight had been kept up not very long, when information was brought of the arrival of General McLaws with reinforcements at Salem Church, and Wilcox was ordered to withdraw to that point.

Lee, as already stated, had been informed of the capture of the Heights of Fredericksburg, and the advance of Sedgwick, just as he was preparing to follow up his victory of the morning by an assault

upon the new position behind which Hooker had found cover. It was necessary at once to take measures to avert the danger to his communications, and ward off the threatened blow from his rear. For this purpose, McLaws, with Mahone's brigade, in addition to those of Wofford, Semmes, and Kershaw, was despatched on the Plank Road to meet the enemy. Operations were suspended at Chancellorsville to see the result of this movement.

SALEM CHURCH.

As McLaws moved down the Plank Road, at the junction of the Mine Road with it, he halted Wofford's brigade, to guard against an approach from that direction. With the other three brigades he moved on to Salem Church. Here he formed in line of battle perpendicular to the road, with Mahone on the extreme left, Semmes next, then Wilcox (who fell back to this point), on both sides of the road, two of his regiments being on the left and three on the right of it, and then Kershaw. Wofford was afterwards ordered up, and took position on Kershaw's right. The artillery was placed in the road, and to cover the flanks, but the guns being nearly exhausted of ammunition were soon withdrawn. Four guns were placed in the centre of Wilcox's front, where the road divided it. Wilcox placed troops in the church on the right of the road, and also in a school-house, some sixty yards in advance of the line. These dispositions had hardly been

completed when the Federal attack was made. Sedgwick had ordered Brooks' division, which had moved up the road, and on both sides of it in a line of battle, to push forward. Bartlett's brigade was on the Federal left and the First New Jersey on their right. Newton's division, which followed Brooks', in column, was ordered to deploy on the right.

The Confederate line was in a thick wood, which extended two hundred and fifty yards to their front. On the left a ravine running to the Rappahannock afforded shelter. The ground fell away slightly in front. Beyond the wood cleared fields extended on both sides of the road as far as, and beyond, the toll-gate. The Federal advance had to be made over this cleared space up to the wood in which the Confederates were posted. The distance from the toll-gate to McLaws' line of battle was about one thousand yards.

The Federal attack was delayed by the artillery, which the Confederates had posted in the road, and which for fifteen or twenty minutes kept up a brisk fire with Sedgwick's guns in position at the toll-gate. Ammunition having given out the Confederate guns retired. After shelling the woods to the right and left of the road a short time, the Union troops advanced. A brisk skirmish ensued. The Confederate skirmishers were pushed back to the wood, and then upon their line of battle. The Federal line followed quickly. Reaching the edge of the wood they gave a cheer and rushed forward to the charge. On, on they came, to within eighty yards of the opposing line. Here

they receive the Confederate fire which has been reserved. Well directed, and at close quarters, its effect is fearful. A scene of carnage presents itself. The line wavers under the withering fire, but it is only for a moment. Bartlett dashes on. He surrounds the school-house and captures the garrison. Then pushing forward to the line in the rear, he delivers all the impetus of his attack on the regiment stationed there. It wavers, yields, breaks. A little farther on, and the victory had been won. Wilcox has a regiment (Ninth Alabama) in reserve just behind this part of his line. In a moment he hurls this upon the advancing troops. The Alabamians deliver a deadly fire at close quarters, and rush forward to gain what has been lost. Gallantly does Bartlett strive to hold the advantage won at such cost. A fierce struggle, and in turn the Federal line gives way. No time is allowed it to rally. Wilcox follows closely, increasing at each step the confusion and carnage in the Federal ranks. The school-house is reached, the captured garrison is set free, and their captors are in turn captives. On the other side of the road the attack, which was not vigorous, has also been repulsed. The Confederate troops then press the retreating enemy. The Federal commander hurries forward at double-quick his second line. Quickly taking the place of the first, it attempts to stem the current and turn the scale. The contest is sharp and short. Once more the Federal line is broken by the close and effective fire of the Confederates, and the troops rush in

confusion to the rear. Semmes advances with Wilcox and the fields are cleared of Federal troops to the toll-gate. Here the masses of Sedgwick are in reserve. Two brigades cannot with prudence carry the pursuit farther. Night, too, has closed in. The Confederates return unmolested to their former position, leaving pickets far out in the open fields. Wilcox has lost in his brigade between three and four hundred men. Bartlett, whose brigade has been principally opposed to him, has seven hundred, *hors du combat*.

Thus ended the action at Salem Church, in which the last hope of a junction between Sedgwick and Hooker was destroyed. The delay at Fredericksburg and Marye's Hill had given Lee time to defeat and dislodge Hooker, and when the advance which, made in the morning, might have given a decisive advantage to the Federal arms, was only pushed forward late in the afternoon, it was to meet a bloody repulse. Troops, that had fought and aided to win the day at Chancellorsville, were marched to Salem Church in time to give a severe check to Sedgwick. The Federal commander was allowing his army to be beaten in detail. Night found him worsted at every point. The plans of the morning had all been frustrated. Instead of throwing his force at Chancellorsville upon one or the other wing of the Confederate army, half of it had been unengaged while the other half had been defeated by the combined attack of the whole Confederate strength at that place. Sickles, Slocum, and Couch, had borne the brunt of the battle, while

Meade, Reynolds, and Howard, had been comparatively unemployed. Instead of crushing the Confederate right wing between Sedgwick and the main army at Chancellorsville, Hooker had seen the two portions of his army worsted in succession.

Night closed in on the bloody field. The main Confederate force under Lee in person, held the line at Chancellorsville, which had been taken up after the battle in the morning, and fortified. It extended along the Plank and Turnpike roads; and confronted Hooker's position, at Bullock's House, on the road to the fords. Anderson had been sent in the evening down the River Road near to its junction with the Mine Road, to watch that road, and threaten the enemy's communications. He had with him three brigades, and fourteen pieces of rifled artillery under Major Hardaway. It was night when he reached the point indicated, and he remained quiet until morning. McLaws slept upon his arms at Salem Church in front of Sedgwick, and Early concentrated his troops at Cox's on the Telegraph Road. During the night the latter, with General Lee's approval, made preparations to attack Marye's Hill and Sedgwick's rear at daylight.

MONDAY, MAY 4TH.

In the morning, May 4th, Early moved forward toward Fredericksburg. (Map, No. 5.) He threw Hays' and Hoke's brigades to the right of Hazel Run, while he advanced directly upon Marye's Hill with Gordon's

brigade and Andrews' battalion of artillery. Smith and Barksdale followed Gordon. But a small Federal force had been left on the Fredericksburg Heights. On this Early opened his artillery, and soon after Gordon advanced at a charge, and in a few moments these famous heights were once more in possession of the Confederates. Barksdale's brigade was brought forward, and again occupied the trenches at the bottom of the hill. Andrews' artillery was to act in conjunction with him. Upon reconnoitering the town, it was found to be strongly held by a part of General Gibbon's division, while the remainder of his force with his artillery commanded it from the north side of the river. Barksdale was instructed to prevent an advance from the direction of the town, while Early, moving up his other troops, formed a line of battle facing towards Chancellorsville. Smith's brigade was pushed forward to feel the enemy's position. He was found to be in force. The heights near the river were held by his artillery. Early sent information of the state of affairs to McLaws, and having requested him to attack in conjunction with himself, waited for this co-operation.

Anderson, who had moved down the River Road late on Sunday evening, prepared during the night for a demonstration against the extreme left of Hooker's line. A large park of wagons was discovered on the north side of the river, within range of the rifled artillery, and at daylight, Major Hardway opened fire upon it, causing a great stampede.

Meanwhile Anderson pushed forward his skirmishers to develop the enemy's strength and position, and found him holding and fortifying the high ridge along the Mineral Spring Road. It was at this junction that orders were received from General Lee instructing Anderson to proceed to Salem Church, to unite with McLaws and Early in attacking Sedgwick. Heth, with three brigades, relieved him.

On the morning of the 4th, General Lee reconnoitered the position held by the main body of the Federal army, and finding that it had been much strengthened during the previous evening and night, deemed it inexpedient to attack until he could concentrate his whole force. To do this it was necessary to dispose of Sedgwick, who threatened his communications and his rear. He determined, therefore, to leave the three divisions of Jackson's Corps, already at Chancellorsville, to hold Hooker in check, while he concentrated the remainder of his force, consisting of Anderson's, McLaws', and Early's divisions, upon Sedgwick, to drive him, if possible, beyond the Rappahannock. These three divisions amounted now to twenty-three thousand muskets, in numbers about equal to Sedgwick's force. If this strategy should prove successful, Lee then might hurl the entire strength of his army upon Hooker, should the latter attempt to maintain himself longer on the south side of the Rappahannock. Accordingly, active movements were suspended at Chancellorsville. Anderson was ordered to take position on McLaws' right, and forming his

line parallel to the Plank Road, to connect with Early. General Lee went in person to direct the attack.

General Sedgwick found himself in the morning confronted by McLaws, and threatened in rear by Early. He formed Howe's division facing towards Fredericksburg to resist the latter, and extended his line to the Rappahannock, near Taylor's House, to secure his flank and his communication with Banks' Ford. Hooker sent instructions not to attack, unless the main Federal force at Chancellorsville did so, but to look well to his communications and the safety of his Corps. (Appendix No. 8.) The Federal commander suggested, that, if forced to retire, Sedgwick should prefer Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg as a point of crossing; but urged that a position should be maintained if possible on the south side of the Rappahannock. General Sedgwick, cut off from Fredericksburg by Early's advance, formed his line to cover Banks' Ford and the pontoon bridge near that point. Howe's division formed his left, stretching from the River to a point a short distance south of the Plank Road. Brooks was upon the right of Howe, and formed in line at right angles to him, and parallel to the road. Newton was upon the right of the line, which again bent round perpendicular to the Plank Road, and here occupied the same position as on the previous evening. Sedgwick's lines were long and necessarily weak, but rather than risk the danger of retiring in open day before an enemy, he determined to maintain them until nightfall.

Anderson's three brigades were placed in position upon Early's left. A considerable gap existed between McLaws and Anderson, which was to be filled by the former, as the whole line closed in upon the enemy. The attack was to be made simultaneously. Anderson had arrived at Salem Church by midday, but, owing to the nature of the ground and the delay in reconnoitering Sedgwick's position, the preparations for the advance were not completed until six, P. M. Skirmishing had, however, been kept up all day by Early and McLaws; and Sedgwick, seeing that he was to be pressed in front and rear, had represented to General Hooker that his position was untenable. (Appendix No. 9.) At the appointed signal Early and Anderson moved forward and attacked the Union troops. The contest was short; Sedgwick's lines gave way at the first onset, and he retired some distance towards Banks' Ford. The pursuit was pressed as vigorously as night, now rapidly closing in, and the nature of the country would admit. Gordon, on Early's right, pressed forward and captured Taylor's Hill; the position selected by Hooker for Sedgwick to hold in case he were forced back to the River. This hill, which rises a bluff from the River, commanded everything in its vicinity. Its fall compelled a still farther withdrawal of Howe's line. On Early's left Hays and Hoke were delayed in following up the retreating enemy by being entangled in the brush. They halted to reform, when a portion of Smith's brigade came

forward to their assistance. Meanwhile, Anderson pressed forward to the Plank Road. One of the brigades (Wright's) charged the Federal troops at Downman's House, and quickly capturing the position pushed the retiring columns towards the River. The Confederate artillery played with great effect upon the retreating masses. The Union loss was very heavy. McLaws failed to attack at the proper time, and allowed the troops in his front to be withdrawn without molestation. This withdrawal was rendered necessary by the advance of the Confederates on the other portions of the line, and was made with great haste at nightfall. A thick fog settled over the field and added to the difficulties of the pursuit. Under cover of it Brooks' and Newton's divisions were placed in position at Banks' Ford, and upon them Howe fell back. After night McLaws sent forward Wilcox with Kershaw's brigade and part of his own, to follow up the foe, but it was too late to effect any important result. The Federal retreat showed many evidences of demoralization. The country over which they passed was strewn with guns and knapsacks. Many prisoners were picked up by the pursuing forces. Night alone, most probably, saved the Sixth Corps from a complete rout.

The position now taken by Sedgwick was under cover of thirty-four pieces of artillery on the north side of the River, which protected his bridges, which were laid at Scott's Ford, a short distance below Banks' Ford. But he had suffered too severely in the

recent engagements to make it prudent to risk another day's battle with his troops in their present condition. In two days he had lost more than one fifth of his force. His position, and even his bridges, were exposed to severe shelling. Under these circumstances he despatched as follows to General Hooker :

"BANKS' FORD, *May 4, 1863*—11:45, P. M.

"GENERAL HOOKER :

"My army is hemmed in upon the slope covered by the guns on the north side of Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to care for I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard by retaining it here? An immediate answer is indispensable. I may [unintelligible] to withdraw.

"JOHN SEDGWICK."

At one, A. M., on the fifth, this was answered by General Butterfield, Chief of Staff, to "withdraw under cover." The movement to recross was at once commenced and by five, A. M., the Federal troops were all withdrawn to the north side, and the bridges taken up. While the last brigade was crossing an order was received from General Hooker countermanding the withdrawal. This order was based on a despatch of General Sedgwick's, sent in the afternoon, stating that he could hold a position south of the Rappahannock. This despatch reached Hooker subsequent to the one given above, and caused the change in orders as follows :

"MAY 5, 1863—1:20, A. M.

"GENERAL SEDGWICK :

"Yours received one, A. M., saying that you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"Major-General Commanding."

To this Sedgwick replied at five, A. M. :

"The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung and in process of being taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The despatch countermanding my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed."

TUESDAY, MAY 5TH.

During the night General Gibbons was directed to withdraw from Fredericksburg, and on the morning of the fifth the Confederates found themselves in full possession of all the south side of the river below Hooker's position at Chancellorsville. The movement against Sedgwick was a final and complete success. Not only had his designs against the Confederate rear been defeated, but he had been driven back across the river with the loss of five thousand men. This was accomplished in the face of the Federal army at Chancellorsville, which did not venture from its intrenchments to his relief. This day decided finally the fate of the whole movement. Lee was now free to concentrate all his forces against Hooker, while the latter was deprived of the use of one third of his command.

For the Sixth Corps had suffered so severely in men and morale that it was not available for immediate service, even had it been transferred to Chancellorsville.

During the forenoon of the 5th, therefore, General Lee, leaving Early's division and Barksdale's brigade to guard the River from Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg and the crossings below, ordered Anderson and McLaws to return to Chancellorsville. Early in the afternoon, before Anderson's troops had reached their destination, a violent storm broke over the field. The rain fell in torrents, and soon the spongy soil was converted into mire. The little streams were greatly swollen and the low flats covered with water. The storm continued with little abatement during the night and next day. When the Confederate troops were all in position, such was the lateness of the hour and the violence of the storm that nothing could be done that evening, and consequently the assault on the Federal works was deferred until the next day.

So soon as Hooker learned from Sedgwick that he was compelled to recross the River, the Federal commander determined to withdraw his whole army. This seemed the only course dictated by prudence and good judgment. After the severe losses of Saturday and Sunday, an attack upon the Confederate army offered but little prospect of success. Sedgwick, in conjunction with whom such an attack was to have

been made, had been overwhelmed, while the army at Chancellorsville found itself unable to go to his assistance, or to make an effective diversion in his favor. If such was the case when half of Lee's forces was engaged with Sedgwick, what now could result from an attack upon the Confederate army re-united. A repulse almost insured disaster. In such a country, with a river difficult of passage in his rear, a reverse in the face of the Confederate army, flushed with success, would be equivalent to ruin. A similar objection held against any attempt of Hooker to maintain his position and receive Lee's attack. Twice had he been driven from his intrenchments. To risk such a contingency the third time, was to invite defeat. The character of the country enabled an attacking force to be precipitated without warning on any point, and retarded all quick manoeuvring to meet it. Guided by such considerations, General Hooker decided upon a retreat, though this movement was also full of danger, in presence of a victorious foe. On the night of the 4th, he called his corps commanders together, "not as a council of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I [he] considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front." The majority of them coincided with the commanding general in opinion. During the 5th, preparations were made for recrossing the Rappahannock. The roads and bridges were repaired; an interior line of works was constructed, from Scott's Dam to the mouth of Hunting

Run, in case Lee should follow and attack. The storm on the evening and night of the 5th, greatly favored the movement, by concealing it. At nightfall the retreat was begun. The artillery first passed over; then followed the infantry. The river rose so rapidly from the rain that the ends of the pontoon bridges were at one time submerged, and the current threatened to carry them away. These difficulties were soon however overcome by the Engineers, and the troops continued to pass over. By daylight, the great mass of the Federal army was on the north side, and by eight, A. M., General Meade, who covered the rear with his corps, had recrossed. When the Confederate pickets were advanced in the morning, the retreat of Hooker's army was discovered. Pursuit was ordered, but ere the pursuers reached the river, the whole Federal army was in safety beyond it. Nothing remained on the south side except several hospitals of wounded, which they were not able to remove.

The Army of the Potomac returned to its old camp, opposite Fredericksburg. General Lee left two brigades to guard the battle-field, while the wounded were being removed, the captured property collected, and surveys made of the field of battle. The remainder of his troops he led back to their old position in rear, and to the right of Fredericksburgh. Several days after, a truce was granted, under which the Federal commander sent over and removed his wounded.

The losses of the respective combatants in these series of engagements were as follows :

FEDERAL LOSS (OFFICIAL).

First Corps	292
Second Corps	2,025
Third Corps	4,039
Fifth Corps.....	699
Sixth Corps	4,601
Eleventh Corps.....	2,508
Twelfth Corps.....	2,883
Engineer Corps.....	3
Signal Corps.....	2
Cavalry Corps	145
Total	<u>17,197</u>

CONFEDERATE LOSS—KILLED AND WOUNDED (OFFICIAL).

Jackson's Corps :

Early's Division.....	851
A. P. Hill's Division.....	2,583
Trimble's Division (Colston's)...	1,868
D. H. Hill's Division (Rodes')...	2,178
Anderson's Division	1,180
McLaw's Division.....	1,379
Artillery	227
Cavalry.....	<u>11</u>
Total.....	<u>10,277</u>

We have no official report of the number of prisoners lost by the Confederate army, but estimating it at two thousand, which it could hardly have exceeded, the total Confederate loss was twelve thousand two hundred and seventy-seven.

The Confederate army captured thirteen pieces of artillery at Chancellorsville, and lost eight at Fredericksburg, having thus a net gain of five pieces. They also captured nineteen thousand five hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and a large quantity of ammunition. Five thousand prisoners, exclusive of wounded, were taken by them. These are included in the statement of the Federal loss given above.

STONEMAN'S RAID.

While the battles we have described were in progress, Stoneman, with the great body of the Federal cavalry, was prosecuting his raid (Map No. 1) against the depôts and communications of the Confederate army. We have already seen that, on the 30th of April, Averill, with one division of cavalry had pushed after W. H. F. Lee, to Rapidan Station, where the latter made a stand; while Stoneman with the main column, took up the line of march for Louisa Court-House. Averill, whose column consisted of near four thousand men, accomplished nothing. On the 1st of May, he skirmished all day with the two regiments under W. H. F. Lee, without driving him from his position at Rapidan. Lee's force was about nine hundred. During the day Lee burnt the bridge over the river,

and after night retired unmolested to Gordonsville. Early on the morning of the 2d, Averill began to retire. During that day he carried his whole force back to Elley's Ford, where he arrived at 10:30, P. M. Shortly after this it was that a dash was made at his camp by Fitz Lee's cavalry, and the Sixteenth North Carolina infantry, just as Stuart, who commanded this force, was recalled to assume the command left vacant by the fall of Jackson. The Confederates soon retired. Averill took no part in the battles of the succeeding day. In the morning, he reconnoitred the country on the left of the Confederate line, but found it impracticable for cavalry, and remained, in consequence, quietly in camp. General Hooker, on account of this conduct, displaced him, on the evening of the 3d, from command, and turned over his division to General Pleasanton.

While Averill's expedition was thus coming to a fruitless termination, the main body of the Federal cavalry, under Stoneman in person, had crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford and were moving toward Louisa Court-House. This latter point was reached without opposition, early on Saturday morning, May 25th. This column seized all the property that could be of use found in their line of march. The citizens were in many cases entirely stripped of the necessaries of life. When General Stoneman reached Louisa Court-House, parties were at once set to work to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad above and below that place. They effected a considerable amount

of damage. A party despatched toward Gordonsville to scout and tear up the railroad, fell in with one of W. H. F. Lee's regiments, which that officer had sent out to reconnoitre upon learning that the enemy were at Louisa Court-House. A sharp contest ensued, in which the Federal cavalry were driven for some distance until coming upon their supports they in turn forced the Confederates to retire. Lee brought up his whole force and placed it in position to meet the enemy, but these did not continue to advance, and at nightfall he returned to Gordonsville to rest his wearied troops, worn out by incessant marching and fighting.

In the evening General Stoneman moved his command to Thompson's Cross-roads, preparatory to sending out detachments in every direction to sever the communications of the Confederate army, and to destroy its depôts. He thus describes his plan and the arrangements for carrying it into execution :

"I called together all my regimental commanders, showed and explained to them the maps, and gave them an idea of what I wished done. I gave them, to understand that we had dropped in that region like a shell and that I intended to burst it in every direction, expecting each piece or fragment would do as much harm and create nearly as much terror as would result from sending the whole shell, and thus magnify our small force into overwhelming numbers; and the results of this plan satisfied my most sanguine expectations. I pointed out to them the routes to be

taken, and the objects to be accomplished on each route. One party, the First New Jersey, under Colonel Wyndham, was to strike the James River at Columbia at the junction of the James and Rivanna Rivers, to destroy, if possible, the large canal aqueduct over the Rivanna, and thence proceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing all the harm possible. If thought expedient (and this was left to the discretion of the commanding officer) a party was to be sent across the James River, and to make a dash at the railroad bridge over the Appomattox.

"Another party, Second New York, Colonel Kilpatrick, was to push on to the railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them and the telegraph, and operate in the direction of Richmond, four miles distant from the bridge.

"Another force, Twelfth Illinois cavalry, Colonel Davis, was to strike the two railroads at or in the vicinity of Ashland, on the Fredericksburg, and Atlee's on the Virginia Central, and do all the harm it could.

"Another party, First Maine and First Maryland, with a section of artillery, all under General Gregg, was to follow down the South Anna River, destroy all the road bridges thereon, and, if possible, the two railroad bridges across the river.

"Another party, Fifth cavalry, under Captain Drummond, was to follow this last and see that the destruction was complete.

"Captain Merritt, with a flying party of the First

Maryland, was sent out to do what he thought he could accomplish in the way of destroying bridges, &c.

"These different parties all got off by three, A. M., on the 3d. After all these parties had moved, and outposts established, one of which was to hold the only bridge across the South Anna, which was to be left undestroyed for our own use in case of need, I found myself with but about five hundred men of General Buford's brigade, and near two hundred partially broken-down horses of General Gregg's division, which was to serve as a nucleus, and upon which the different parties could rally in case of necessity after they had performed the work assigned them to do."

Colonel Wyndham with his party entered Columbia at eight, A. M., and immediately set to work to do what injury was possible to the James River Canal, and to the public property found in the town. A considerable number of horses were taken from the citizens. The want of blasting material prevented any serious damage to the canal. General W. H. F. Lee was informed by his scouts, early on Sunday morning, of the movements of this force, and started in pursuit. Upon his approach to Columbia in the afternoon, Colonel Wyndham withdrew down the river, and then changing his course, returned to Thompson's Cross-Roads by ten o'clock at night. He made no attempt to cross James River. Lee pursued him during the night, and in the morning came upon a party of the Fifth cavalry, which he routed, taking thirty-three prisoners. Here learning that he was

close upon Buford's brigade, he gave up the pursuit and returned to Gordonsville.

Colonel Kilpatrick, having travelled all day and night, on Sunday, reached Hungary Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, at daylight on Monday morning, the 4th. Here he destroyed the depôts and tore up the railroad. Then crossing to the Brook Turnpike he pushed on, to within two and a half miles of Richmond. He next marched to Meadow Bridge, where the Central Railroad crosses the Chickahominy, and destroyed it, together with an engine, which he intercepted at that point. He then crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover town to avoid pursuit. Next day he crossed the Mattaponi, and raiding through Essex and the adjoining counties, made his way without opposition to Gloucester Point, on the 7th. He destroyed in his course some wagon trains and small depôts of supplies.

Colonel Davis, marching down the South Anna, struck the Fredericksburg Railroad at Ashland, on Sunday evening, and intercepted an ambulance train filled with the wounded from Chancellorsville. Several Confederate officers were on board, the majority of whom escaped. Among them was a prominent officer on the Staff of the Governor of Virginia, who saved his despatches by changing his coat, and making his way into the woods. The Federal cavalry paroled the prisoners they took, destroyed the engines, and did what damage they could to the railroad, and then pushed on to Hanover Court-House on the Central

Railroad, where they burned the depôt and tore up the track. After having followed the railroad to within seven miles of Richmond they turned off, and next morning started for Williamsburg. At Tunstall's Station, near the White-House, they met a small force of infantry with some artillery, which had been sent out from Richmond to intercept them. Colonel Davis attacked, but was repulsed, when, changing the direction of his march, he crossed the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers, and finally reached Gloucester Point without farther difficulty.

The other expeditions moving down the South Anna, and burning the bridges in their course, destroyed Hanover Junction, and did some damage to the railroad bridges in that vicinity. Nothing of moment, however, was accomplished by these parties, which, after spending Sunday and Monday, in their work, returned. On Tuesday the whole command, except Davis and Kilpatrick, was concentrated at Yanceyville on the South Anna, and on that evening the retrograde movement began. Buford's division made a circuit towards Gordonsville, Gregg's crossed at Yanceyville; both marched for Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan, where they crossed on Thursday. On Friday, the 8th, the whole force recrossed Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock. W. H. F. Lee, learning of their retrograde movement, had moved down on the 6th to harass their left flank and rear, but was unable to follow them across the North Anna on account of high water.

This raid of Stoneman's failed entirely in accomplishing the object for which it had been undertaken. The damage inflicted on the railroads and canals was repaired by the time the raiders had reached their camp beyond the Rappahannock. The Fredericksburg Railroad, the main line of communication between the Confederate army and Richmond, was in running order within three or four days. No serious obstacle had been offered to General Lee's operations at Chancellorsville. Some stores had been destroyed at different points, but these were not sufficient to affect the Confederate commissariat. This failure is the more surprising, from the fact that General Lee had but two regiments of cavalry, those under W. H. F. Lee, to oppose to the large force under Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country in rear of the Confederate army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was collected at Guiney's Depôt, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one fourth of Stoneman's force. The absence of his cavalry was severely felt by Hooker in the great struggle at Chancellorsville, while Lee's plans were in no wise disarranged by their presence in his rear. The contrary, however, might have been the case. Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in the country, that the Confederate Commander could never accumulate more

than a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his communications for any length of time would have imperilled his army, or forced him to retreat. As it was, the Federal cavalry, without effecting the object of its expedition, was unavailable at the critical moment, and returned from a long and exhaustive march, in such condition that several weeks of rest and refitting were necessary to prepare it again to take the field.

CONCLUSION.

Upon their return to their former camps each Commander issued a general order in regard to the battle. They are of interest as emanating from the parties principally concerned in acting the great drama.

These orders were as follows :

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *May 6, 1863.*

The Major-General commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources.

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents.

By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command it.

By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of the river were undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride.

We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments ; and whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received.

We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners and fifteen colors, captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed *hors du combat* eighteen thousand of our foe's chosen troops.

We have destroyed his depôts filled with vast amounts of stores ; damaged his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation.

We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions ; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDER NO. 5.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, *May 7, 1863.*

With heartfelt gratification, the General commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.

Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance He has wrought.

It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto his name.

Let us not forget in our rejoicing, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defence of their country; and while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example.

The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success.

The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their success:

"I have received your despatch, and reverently

unite with you in giving praise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and the wounded."

R. E. LEE, *General*.

Thus ended the battle of Chancellorsville, a contest which, whether we consider the numbers engaged and the losses of the respective combatants, or the issues involved, deserves to be ranked as one of the most considerable of the late war. The Federal Government during the winter of 1862-63 had used all its vast resources to repair the losses of the previous campaign in Virginia, and to put on foot an army which, crushing all opposition, should overwhelm the Confederate authorities in their capital. Men and material were furnished with unsparing hand. A new commander was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, brave, active, energetic. All means were taken to improve the organization, discipline and morale of the army. The result was that at the end of April, General Hooker found himself at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand well-appointed troops, with whom he might readily feel capable of going anywhere. Nor had the Confederate commander-in-

chief been idle in preparing to meet the coming storm. Every effort was made to render the conscripts, with which his ranks were swelled, effective, while every precaution was taken to meet and parry the threatened blow. General Hooker aimed at nothing less than the dispersion and destruction of the Confederate army.

Having flanked Lee out of his magnificently fortified position at Fredericksburg, and severed his connection with his depôts, he expected to overwhelm him with superior numbers. The Confederate leader had been unable to prevent the execution of the first part of this programme, but his bold and skilful strategy neutralized the advantage gained by the movement upon his flank. Then it was that the genius of Jackson shone forth like the setting sun in its most glowing colors. Moving, with the secrecy and rapidity which were his characteristics, completely across the face of the Federal position, when it was imagined that he was flying toward Gordonsville, he descended with less than half their force upon the sixty thousand Federal troops at Chancellorsville. He dealt a blow from which they never recovered. Hooker was forced to exchange the offensive for the defensive. In confusion and dismay his divisions were rolled one upon another, and a disastrous rout of the whole Union army seemed imminent. The fall of Jackson gave a much-needed respite. But the lost ground could never be recovered. Lee vigorously pressed his advantage on the succeeding days. Blow after blow was dealt upon the crippled

army. No opportunity was allowed for recuperation or change of plan. Reeling under these staggering blows, hemmed in on every side, unable to attack, the discomfited army was glad to find refuge on the north side of the Rappahannock.

To the Confederacy the results of this victory were most important. Richmond, the great object of all the Federal campaigns in Virginia, was rendered secure for another year. With the defeat of the chief Union army their plan of operations throughout the whole seat of war was disorganized, and successes elsewhere rendered comparatively valueless. An opportunity was again offered for carrying the Confederate arms beyond the Potomac. Lee was enabled to take the offensive, and to change the scene of operation from Virginia to Pennsylvania. The Southern Government gained in strength and confidence, while despondency and doubt spread over the North. The prospects of the Confederacy appeared brighter than ever before. It seemed as if the most strenuous efforts of the Federal Government were doomed to continued failure in Virginia, as if the power of the South was there too strong to be overcome. The Federal superiority in numbers and equipment had excited, in the commencement of the campaign, high hopes on the one side and many misgivings on the other. Now the Army of the Potomac was again to be refitted; new levies must be made to fill up its ranks, while Maryland and Pennsylvania, unprotected, lay at the mercy of the invader. The Confederate Government proba-

bly possessed more of the real elements of strength, and held out greater promises of permanent success, between the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, than at any other period of its existence.

History will attach a peculiar interest to the battle of Chancellorsville, as the closing scene in the career of Lieutenant-General Jackson. Though the smoke of the conflict still hangs too densely upon the field to permit us to measure men and events, with the accuracy and clearness, with which the future will judge them, yet, in regard to this great man the present generation can but have anticipated the verdict of posterity. He was the most remarkable man produced by our civil war. His previous comparative obscurity, his rapid rise to power and fame, his wonderful achievements with means always limited, and success almost unbroken, the mighty enthusiasm with which he inspired soldiers and people, give to his career the character of romance, and seem rather the fancied story of some knight of old, than the history of a simple and unpretending citizen. His career as a Confederate officer extended over exactly two years. On the 2d of May, 1861, he was placed in command at Harper's Ferry ; on the 2d of May, 1863, he fell at Chancellorsville. History records but few names which, in so short a time, were raised to so lofty a pinnacle of fame. It is yet perhaps too soon to analyze his deeds, and assign them their proper place, but those achievements which won the unbounded love and gratitude of his countrymen, which

inspired his foes with admiration, and fixed the gaze of a world in wonder, will lose nothing of their brilliancy when subjected to the ordeal of time and history. Nor will Chancellorsville be considered as an unworthy close to the bright catalogue. The military qualities for which he was most distinguished shone out here in bold relief, and achieved a result not inferior to the greatest of his victories. The daring of the plan threw the foe off his guard; the boldness and alacrity with which it was executed allowed him no time to recover. There it was that followed by twenty-five thousand men whose enthusiastic confidence in him knew no bounds, he, at a single blow, crippled an army more than twice as numerous. He fell ere his victory was completed, but enough had been done to fill up the full measure of his fame. The news of Chancellorsville brought but a saddened joy to his country. For a few days the people waited in agonizing suspense, unwilling, unable to realize the threatened blow. Then came the announcement of his death, and one universal wail of lamentation, went up from the Potomac to the Gulf. From the President, who wept over his bier in the capitol, to the humble widow who forgot her own bereavement in her country's loss, every heart was weighed down with sorrow. All classes and every portion of the South united with Virginia and the bronzed soldiers he had so often led to victory, in mourning over his grave. Had success crowned the efforts of the South, a nation would have heaped its choicest honors on his memory. As it

is, he remains enshrined in the hearts of a mighty people. To the world and posterity, his countrymen, without hesitation, commit his fame. He shone, a meteor upon the stage of action, but has left a name which the future will love and venerate, so long as mankind bow at the shrine of brilliant genius and heroic virtue.

THE LAST DAYS OF JACKSON.

THE party bearing General Jackson met Dr. Hunter McGuire, who had been sent for, with an ambulance a short distance in rear of the Confederate line. The Doctor knelt down by him and said, "I hope you are not badly hurt, General." He replied, very calmly but feebly: "I am badly injured, Doctor, I fear I am dying." After a pause he continued: "I am glad you have come. I think the wound in my shoulder is still bleeding." His clothes were saturated with blood, and hemorrhage was still going on from the wound. Compression of the artery with the finger arrested it, until, lights being procured from the ambulance, the handkerchief which had slipped a little was readjusted. His calmness amid the danger which surrounded him, and at the supposed presence of death, and his uniform politeness, which did not forsake him, even under these, the most trying circumstances, were remarkable. His complete control, too, over his mind, enfeebled as it was by loss of blood, pain, &c., was wonderful. His suffering at this time was intense, his hands were cold, his skin clammy, his face pale, and his lips compressed and bloodless. Not a groan escaped him, not a sign of suffering, except the slight corrugation of his brow, the fixed rigid face, and the thin lips, so tightly compressed,

that the impression of the teeth could be seen through them. Except these, he controlled, by his own will, all evidence of emotion, and more difficult than this even, he controlled that disposition to restlessness, which many of us have observed upon the field of battle, attending great loss of blood. Some whiskey and morphia were procured from Dr. Straith and administered to him, and placing him in the ambulance it was started for the Corps Field Infirmary at the Wilderness Tavern. Colonel Crutchfield, his Chief of Artillery, was also in the ambulance wagon. He had been wounded very severely in the leg and was suffering intensely. The General expressed very feelingly his sympathy for Crutchfield ; and once when the latter groaned aloud, he directed the ambulance to stop, and requested the Surgeon to see if something could not be done for his relief. Torches had been provided, and every means to carry them to the Hospital as safely and easily as possible. Dr. McGuire sat in the front part of the ambulance, with his finger resting upon the artery above the wound, to arrest bleeding if it should occur. When he was recognized by acquaintances, and asked who was wounded, the General would tell him to say a "Confederate officer." At one time he put his right hand upon the Doctor's head, and pulling him down to him, asked if Crutchfield was dangerously wounded. When answered, "No, only painfully hurt," he replied, "I am glad it is no worse." In a few moments after Crutchfield did the same thing, and when he was told

that the General was very seriously wounded, he groaned and cried out, "Oh, my God!" It was for this that the General directed the ambulance to be halted, and requested that something should be done for Crutchfield's relief. After reaching the Hospital he was placed in bed, covered with blankets, and another drink of whiskey-and-water given him. Two hours and a half elapsed before sufficient reaction took place, to warrant an examination. At two o'clock Sunday morning, Surgeons Black, Wall, and Coleman, being present, Dr. McGuire informed him that chloroform would be given him and his wound examined. He told him that amputation would probably be required, and asked, if it was found necessary, whether it should be done at once. He replied promptly, "Yes, certainly, Dr. McGuire, do for me whatever you think best." Chloroform was then administered, and as he began to feel its effects, and its relief to the pain he was suffering, he exclaimed: "What an infinite blessing!" and continued to repeat the word "blessing" until he became insensible. The round ball, such as is used for the smooth-bore Springfield muskets, which had lodged under the skin upon the back of his right hand, was extracted first. It had entered the palm, about the middle of the hand, and had fractured two of the bones. The left arm was then amputated about two inches below the shoulder, very rapidly, and with slight loss of blood. There were two wounds in this arm. The first and most serious was about three inches below the shoulder joint, dividing the

main artery, and fracturing the bone. The second was several inches in length ; a ball having entered the outside of the forearm, an inch below the elbow, came out upon the opposite side, just above the wrist. Throughout the whole of the operation, and until all the dressings were applied, he continued insensible. About half-past three o'clock Colonel (then Major) Pendleton, the assistant Adjutant-General, arrived at the hospital, and asked to see the General. He stated that General Hill had been wounded, and that the troops were in great disorder. General Stuart was in command and had sent him to see the General. At first the surgeon declined to permit an interview, but the Colonel urged that the safety of the army and the success of the cause might depend upon his seeing him. When he entered the tent, the General said, "Well, Major, I am glad to see you, I thought you were killed." Pendleton briefly explained the condition of affairs, gave Stuart's message, and asked what should be done. General Jackson was at once interested, and asked in his quick, rapid way, several questions. When they were answered he remained silent for a moment, evidently trying to think, he contracted his brow, set his mouth, and for some moments was obviously endeavoring to concentrate his thoughts. For a moment it was believed he had succeeded, for his nostril dilated, and his eye flashed its old fire ; but it was only for a moment. His face relaxed again, presently he answered very feebly and sadly, "I don't know, I can't tell ; say to General Stuart

he must do what he thinks best." Soon after this he slept for several hours, and seemed to be doing well. The next morning he was free from pain, and expressed himself sanguine of recovery. He sent his aide-de-camp, Morrison, to inform his wife of his injuries, and to bring her at once to see him. The following note from General Lee, was read to him that morning, by Captain Smith :

" *May 3, 1863.*

" GENERAL :

"I have just received your note informing me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been disabled in your stead. I congratulate you on the victory which is due to your skill and energy.

"R. E. LEE, *General.*"

He said "General Lee should give the praise to God." About ten o'clock his right side began to pain him so much that he asked to have it examined. He said he had injured it in falling from the litter the night before, and believed that he had struck it against a stone, or the stump of a sapling. No evidence of injury could be discovered by examination; the skin was not broken or bruised, and the lung performed, as far as could be told, its proper functions. Some simple application was recommended, in the belief that the pain would soon disappear.

At this time the battle was raging fearfully, and

the sound of the cannon and musketry could be very distinctly heard at the hospital. The General's attention was attracted to it from the first, and when the noise was at its height, and indicated how fiercely the conflict was being carried on, he directed all of his attendants except Captain Smith, to return to the battle-field, and attend to their different duties. By eight o'clock on Sunday night the pain in his side had disappeared, and in all respects he seemed doing well. He inquired minutely about the battle, and the different troops engaged, and his face would light up with enthusiasm and interest, when told how this brigade acted, or that officer displayed conspicuous courage, and his head gave the peculiar shake from side to side, and he uttered his usual "Good, good," with unwonted energy, when the gallant behavior of the Stonewall brigade was alluded to. He said, "The men of that brigade will be some-day, proud to say to their children 'I was one of the Stonewall brigade.'" He disclaimed any right of his own to the name Stonewall. "It belongs to the brigade, and not to me." This night he slept well, and was free from pain. A message was received from General Lee, the next morning, directing the removal of the General to Guiney's Station, as soon as his condition would justify it, as there was some danger of capture by the enemy, who were threatening to cross at Elley's Ford. In the mean time, to protect the hospital, some troops were sent to this point. The General objected to being moved, if, in the opinion of

the surgeon it would do him any injury. He said he had no objection to staying in a tent, and would prefer it, if his wife, when she came, could find lodging in a neighboring house; "and if the enemy does come," he added, "I am not afraid of them, I have always been kind to their wounded, and I am sure they will be kind to me." General Lee sent word again late that evening, that he must be moved if possible, and preparations were made to leave the next morning. Dr. McGuire was directed to accompany and remain with him, and his duties with the corps as Medical Director, were turned over to the surgeon next in rank. General Jackson had previously declined to permit Dr. McGuire to go with him to Guiney's, because complaints had been so frequently made of general officers, when wounded, carrying off with them the surgeons belonging to their commands. When informed of this order of the Commanding General, he said, "General Lee has always been very kind to me, and I thank him."

Very early Tuesday morning he was placed in an ambulance and started for Guiney's Station, and about eight o'clock that evening he arrived at the Chandler House, where he remained till he died. Captain Hotchkiss, with a party of pioneers, was sent in front to clear the road of wood, stone, &c., and to order the wagons out of the track to let the ambulance pass. The rough teamsters sometimes refused to move their loaded wagons out of the way for an ambulance, until told that it contained Jackson, and

then with all possible speed they gave the way, and stood with hats off, and weeping, as he went by. At Spotsylvania Court-House and along the whole route, men and women rushed to the ambulance, bringing all the poor delicacies they had, and with tearful eyes they blessed him, and prayed for his recovery. He bore the journey well, and was cheerful throughout the day. He talked freely about the late battle, and among other things said, that he had intended to cut the enemy off from the United States Ford, and taking a position between them and the river, oblige them to attack him, and he added, with a smile, "My men sometimes fail to drive the Yankees from a position, but they always fail to drive us away." He spoke of Rodes and alluded in high terms to his magnificent behavior on the field, Saturday evening. He hoped he would be promoted. He thought promotions for gallantry should be made at once upon the field, and not delayed; made very early, or upon the field they would be the greatest incentives to gallantry in others. He spoke of Colonel Willis,* who commanded the skirmishers of Rodes' division, and praised him very highly, and referred to the death of Paxton* and Boswell* very feelingly. He alluded to

* Brigadier-General Paxton, commanding the Stonewall brigade, and Colonel Ed. Willis, commanding the Twelfth Georgia regiment, had both served as staff officers to General Jackson. Captain Boswell was his chief engineer, and had fallen by the same fire that wounded Jackson. Paxton fell at the head of his brigade in its charge on Sunday morning at Chancellorsville. The brave and noble Willis was killed subsequently, while leading Pegram's brigade, in a charge at Bethesda Church, on May 30, 1864.

them as officers of great merit and promise. The day was quite warm, and at one time he suffered from slight nausea. At his suggestion a wet towel was placed over his stomach, and he expressed great relief from it. After he arrived at Chandler's House, he ate some bread and tea with evident relish, and slept well throughout the entire night. Wednesday he was thought to be doing remarkably well. He ate hearty for one in his condition, and was uniformly cheerful. He expressed great satisfaction when told that his wounds were doing remarkably well, and asked the surgeon if he could tell from their appearance how long he would probably be kept from the field. Conversing with Captain Smith, a few moments afterward, he alluded to his wounds and said: "Many would regard them as a great misfortune. I regard them as one of the blessings of my life." Captain Smith replied, "All things work together for good, to those that love God." "Yes," he answered, "that's it, that's it." At Dr. McGuire's request Dr. Morrison came to-day and remained with him. About one o'clock, Thursday morning, he directed his servant, Jim, to apply a wet towel to his stomach to relieve an attack of nausea with which he was again suffering. The servant asked permission to first consult Dr. McGuire, who was sleeping in the room next the General. Knowing that the Doctor had slept none for nearly three entire nights, he refused to allow the servant to disturb him, and desired his chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Lacy, to give him the towel. About daylight, the

doctor was aroused and informed that the General was suffering great pain. An examination disclosed pneumonia of the right lung. It was doubtless attributable to the fall from the litter, the night he was wounded. The General himself believed it was due to this cause. The disease came on too soon after the application of the wet cloths to admit of the supposition, once believed, that it was induced by them. Some effusion of blood in his chest was probably produced by the fall referred to, and the shock and loss of blood prevented any ill effects until reaction had been well established, and then inflammation or pneumonia ensued. Toward the evening of this day he became better, and hopes were again entertained of his recovery. Mrs. Jackson arrived to-day and nursed him faithfully to the end. She was a devoted wife and earnest Christian, and endeared all to her by her great kindness and gentleness. Mrs. Dr. Hoge of Richmond came and remained with her. The General's joy at the presence of his wife and child was very great, and for him unusually demonstrative. Noticing the sadness of his wife, he said to her tenderly, "I know you would gladly give your life for me, but I am perfectly resigned. Do not be sad. I hope I may recover. Pray for me, but always remember in your prayers to use the petition, 'Thy will be done.'" Friday his wounds were again dressed and found to be healing. The pain in his side had disappeared, but he breathed with difficulty, and complained of a feeling of great exhaustion.

When Dr. Breckenridge, who had been sent for, in consultation, said he hoped that a blister which had been applied would afford him relief; he expressed his own confidence in it, and in his final recovery. On Saturday, Dr. Tucker, from Richmond, arrived, in obedience to a telegram, and all that human skill could devise was done to stay the hand of death. He suffered no pain to-day and his breathing was less difficult, but he was evidently, hourly growing weaker. When his child was brought to him to-day he played with it for some time, frequently caressing it, and calling it his "little comforter." At one time he raised his wounded hand above its head, and closing his eyes was, for some moments, silently engaged in prayer. He said to Dr. McGuire: "I see from the number of physicians that you think my condition dangerous, but I thank God, if it is his will, that I am ready to go." About daylight, on Sunday morning, Mrs. Jackson informed him that his recovery was very doubtful, and that it was better he should be prepared for the worst. He was silent for a moment and then said, "It will be infinite gain to be translated to heaven." He advised his wife, in the event of his death, to return to her father's house, and added, "You have a kind and good father, but there is no one so kind and good as your heavenly Father." He still expressed a hope of his recovery, but requested her, if he should die, to have him buried at Lexington, in the Valley of Virginia. His exhaustion increased so rapidly, that,

at eleven o'clock, Mrs. Jackson knelt by his bed and told him that before the sun went down he would be with his Saviour. He replied, "Oh, no, you are frightened, my child, death is not so near. I may yet get well." She fell over upon the bed weeping bitterly, and told him again that the physicians said there was no hope. After a moment's pause he asked her to call Dr. McGuire, who was standing in the ante-room. "Doctor, Anna informs me that you have told her that I am to die to-day, is it so?" When he was answered, he turned his eye toward the ceiling and gazed for a moment or two, as if in intense thought, then replied, "Very good, very good, it is all right." He then tried to comfort his almost heart-broken wife and told her he had a good deal to say to her, but he was too weak. Colonel Pendleton came into the room about one o'clock, and he asked him, "Who is preaching at headquarters to-day?" When told that the whole army was praying for him, he replied, "Thank God, they are very kind." He said, "It is the Lord's day; my wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday."

His mind now began to fail and wander, and he frequently talked as if in command upon the field, giving orders in his old way; then the scene shifted, and he was at the mess-table with members of his staff; now with his wife and child, now at prayers with his military family. Occasional intervals of the return of his mind would appear, and during one of

these he was offered some brandy-and-water, but he declined it, saying, "It will only delay my departure, and do no good. I want to preserve my mind, if possible, to the last." About half-past one he was told that he had but two hours to live, and he answered again, feebly, but firmly, "Very good, it is all right." A few moments before he died, he cried out in his delirium, "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action—pass the infantry to the front rapidly—tell Maj. Hawks——" then stopped, leaving the sentence unfinished. Presently a smile of ineffable sweetness spread itself over his pale face, and he said quietly, and with an expression, as if of relief, "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees." And then, without pain, or the least struggle, his spirit passed from earth to the God who gave it.

Virginia, his mother, even in that sad hour of her agony, paid to his remains all the poor honors she had. At every station on the route to Lexington, women and children flocked to the cars, bringing flowers to deck his coffin, and many a mourning woman, widowed, brotherless, or sonless, came to mourn her country's fearful loss.

In Richmond, every place of business was closed, and tearful crowds gazed on his coffin, as if it contained one who was more than a friend to them. Civic and military processions were made, after which his body lay in state in the capitol, visited by thousands who wept many a tear over the body of the illustrious soldier.

In the quiet village churchyard "at Lexington, in the valley of Virginia," are buried the remains of this immortal hero. His grave is marked by a simple wooden head and foot board, and a flagless staff pointing mutely to heaven. Flowing near by, the beautiful river James sings an unceasing requiem to his memory, and the proud mountains, like some vast chain of sentinels stand keeping eternal watch over the dust of the honored dead.

"His spirit wraps yon dusky mountain,
His memory sparkles o'er each fountain,
The meanest rill, the mightiest river,
Rolls, mingling with his fame for ever."

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, *April* 12, 1863.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, CAVALRY CORPS :

"I am directed by the Major-General commanding, to inform you that you will march at seven o'clock, A. M., on the 13th instant, with all your available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat.

"To accomplish this, the General suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of view of the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to mask your movement and to cut off all communication with the enemy by the people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion, it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of Jones' guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock, some point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance.

"In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run

against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it is expected you will be able to disperse or destroy without delay to your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command.

"At Gordonsville the enemy have a small provost guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward to the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad bridges, trains of cars, depôts of provisions, lines of telegraph communication, &c. The General directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually.

As the line of railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is more probable that he will avail himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, &c., in order to check or prevent it, and if unsuccessful, you will fall back upon his flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit.

"If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the march and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, the General desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be *fight*, and let your orders be *fight*, *FIGHT*, *FIGHT*, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the General as the rebel carcasses.

"It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted,

and after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands.

"The General desires you to understand that he considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes to make everything subservient to that object. He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him.

"If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself to you, to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy depôts of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy the bridges, &c., or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our success.

"You may rely upon the General's being in communication with you before your supplies are exhausted. Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.

"A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock, for Kelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United States Ford and Banks' Ford, to threaten and hold those places.

"It devolves upon you, General, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution, are everything in war, and especially it is the case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

No. 2.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, *April 26, 1863.*

"COMMANDING OFFICER, ELEVENTH CORPS, AND COMMANDING
OFFICER, TWELFTH CORPS :

"I am directed by the Major-General commanding to inform you that the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, in the order named, will begin their march at sunrise to-morrow morning; the former to encamp as near Kelly's Ford as practicable without discovering itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in its rear as circumstances will permit. They will be established in their camps on or before four o'clock, P. M., on Tuesday the 28th instant. Corps commanders will be held responsible that their men are kept in camp and do not go to the river.

"Each corps will march with one battery and two ambulances to a division and the pack train of small ammunition. If necessary a small number of wagons can accompany the column to the camp with forage for animals. The balance of the trains will be parked in the vicinity of Banks' Ford, off the road and convenient to crossing the river at that point. The ammunition wagons and ambulances being in readiness to take the lead in the column, no extra guards for this part of the train will be required.

"Corps commanders can leave behind such men of those whose time of service is about to expire as they think proper, with such instructions for the safety of the camps and preservation of the public property as they may deem necessary. All property not removed with the troops must be turned in to the quartermaster.

"Corps commanders will consider so much of the above as relates to the destination of their commands as strictly confidential.

"Very respectfully, &c.,

"S. WILLIAMS,
"Assistant Adjutant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, *April 27, 1863, 1 A. M.*

"COMMANDING OFFICER, FIFTH CORPS :

"The Major-General commanding directs me to inform you that your corps is to march to-morrow, so as to reach the vicinity of Kelley's Ford by Tuesday at four, P. M. The corps of Generals Slocum and Howard take the same direction (and will be on the same route probably) from Hartwood. The provisions as to rations in the former circular (eight days) will be complied with. The trains will be left at the vicinity of Stoneman's Switch. Such two years' men as you may desire to leave for the purpose may remain as guards. Further details of the orders will be sent you early to-morrow morning. Two ambulances and one battery only will accompany each division, with the pack train of small-arm ammunition. A few wagons only to accompany the column, sufficient to carry forage for the animals.

"The destination of your command will be strictly confidential. General Couch has been directed to send a regiment to Banks' Ford to relieve your regiment there.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,
"Major-General, Chief of Staff."

No. 3.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, *April 27, 1863.*

"COMMANDING OFFICER, SECOND CORPS :

"General: The Major-General commanding directs that you move at sunrise to-morrow morning two divisions of your corps, to encamp as near as practicable at Banks' Ford, without exposing your camps to the view of the

enemy. That one brigade and one battery of one of these two divisions take position at United States Ford. The movement to be made quietly ; the officers and men restrained from exhibiting themselves, or making any show or appearance upon the river, beyond the necessities of picket duty. The division left in camp should be the one whose camps are most exposed to view of the enemy. All of the artillery attached to the two divisions moving up the river must move with them, and be ready to be thrown into position to cover the passage of the river, and to drive the enemy from his defences thrown up opposite that point. Two ambulances to each division will move with them, and a few wagons only allowed, to carry sufficient forage for the animals for four or five days. The pack-mule train, for small-arm ammunition will move with the column ; or in lieu of it, General Couch having none organized, a reserve of ammunition in wagons, to be kept out of the way of the troops and the communications, ready to move forward if needed. The troops will have the (eight days') rations heretofore provided in orders. The trains left will be parked to the rear of Falmouth Station, and out of sight of the enemy, and out of the way of the business of the station. The division left in camp will be directed to keep up the picket line on the river, and in readiness to repel any attempt that may be made by the enemy to cross the river, should the demonstration of the enemy prove of sufficient strength to indicate such a purpose, the Third Corps will be available for support. The division left in camp, as well as the divisions at Banks' and United States Fords, will be held in readiness to follow up any successful movement without delay.

"In moving from camp or breaking camp, the practice of large fires and burning rubbish, will not be permitted.

"If there are any two-years' men that you consider

unreliable in consequence of the near expiration of their term of service, you will leave them on duty with the division left behind. The commanding General desires that you command in person the two divisions going up the river.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“S. WILLIAMS,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

“HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
“CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, April 27, 1863.

“COMMANDING OFFICER, SIXTH CORPS :

“The Major-General commanding directs that the Sixth Corps, Major-General Sedgwick, First Corps, Major-General Reynolds, Third Corps, Major-General Sickles, put themselves in position to cross the river as follows : Sixth Corps, at Franklin’s Crossing ; First Corps at the crossing below, at Pollock’s Mill Creek ; the Third Corps as a support, to cross at either point.

“These movements to be made so that the respective corps are in position, the First and Sixth on or before half-past three, A. M., of the 29th ; the Third Corps, on or before half-past four, A. M., of the 20th.

“The ambulances and trains to be parked in the rear, and concealed behind the range of hills visible to the enemy, and ready to move when desired.

“The troops, as far as possible, ought to be concealed up to the moment the demonstration is made.

“Such batteries of the corps mentioned, and of the reserve artillery, as are required, to be placed in position under the direction of the Chief of Artillery, to cover the crossing. The orders of the Chief of Artillery for the necessary disposition of the batteries to carry out the purposes and plans of the movement will be complied with, and he will be charged with the responsibility of the duties intrusted to him.

“Trains will be loaded with supplies of forage and provisions, to include at least eight days’ short forage for the animals. Whenever an opportunity occurs without interference, the supplies that may have been consumed will be replaced. The troops will have the eight days’ rations as heretofore provided in orders.

“The bridges, two at each crossing, to be laid complete before half-past three, A. M., of the 29th, under the supervision of General Benham, who is charged with the responsibility thereof. Any troops needed to assist the engineer brigade in the performance of this duty will be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of General Sedgwick.

“General Sedgwick, pending the operation, will be charged with the command of the three corps mentioned, and will make a demonstration in full force on Wednesday morning upon the enemy’s defences, with a view to securing the Telegraph Road.

“In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of his force against the troops operating at the west of Fredericksburg, he will attack and carry their works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road, cutting off all communication by the enemy, in order to prevent their turning his position on that road. In case the enemy should fall back on Richmond, he will pursue them with the utmost vigor, fighting them whenever and wherever he can come up with them.

“The Major-General commanding suggests that a part of his force be thrown on the Bowling Green Road in case the enemy retire, and pursuit be made on both these lines. The columns, if they move with equal rapidity, will be within supporting distance, and should be required to march to each other’s assistance as circumstances may require. The ammunition trains and ambulances will be held in readiness to move first.

"General Sedgwick will give such further instructions as may seem to him necessary to carry out the plans and wishes of the Major-General commanding.

"By command of Major-General HOOKER.

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

No. 4.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, *April 30.*

"GENERAL ORDER, No. 47.

"It is with heart-felt satisfaction that the Commanding General announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.

"By command of MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

"S. WILLIAMS,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

No. 5.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"CHANCELLORSVILLE, VIRGINIA, *May, 2, 1863, 1:55 A. M.*

"MAJOR-GENERAL BUTTERFIELD :

"Direct for all of the bridges to be taken up at Franklin's Crossing and below, before daylight, and for Reynolds' Corps to march at once with pack train, to report at headquarters.

"JOSEPH HOOKER,

"Major-General Commanding."

No. 6.

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CHANCELLORSVILLE, VIRGINIA, *May 2, 1863, 9:30, A. M.*

"MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD :

"I am directed by the Major-General commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand, to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

"We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

"JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,
"Brigadier-General, and Aide-de-Camp."

No. 7.

"*May 1, 1863, 11:20.*

"COMMANDING OFFICER, SIXTH CORPS :

"General Hooker telegraphs you to throw your whole force on the Bowling Green Road, and no other. My telegraph communication to the General is roundabout, and takes about three hours' time.

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,
"Major-General and Chief of Staff."

"May 2, 1863, 9:55 A. M.

"COMMANDING OFFICER, SIXTH CORPS :

"General Hooker telegraphs 'that you are all right; you have but Early's division in your front; balance all up here.'

"DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,
"Major-General, Chief of Staff."

No. 8.

"UNITED STATES FORD, May 4, 1863.

"GENERAL SEDGWICK :

"I find everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack them again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with General Benham, at Banks' Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think it best to cross. Banks' Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg.

"G. K. WARREN,
"Brigadier-General."

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CHANCELLORSVILLE, VIRGINIA, May 4, 1863, 11 A. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SEDGWICK :

"The Major-General commanding directs me to say, that he does not wish you to cross the river at Banks' Ford, unless you are compelled to do so.

"The batteries at Banks' Ford command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position south side of the Rappahannock, near Banks' Ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks' Ford; General Taylor commands the reserve artillery there.

"JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,
" *Brigadier-General and A. D. C.*"

No. 9.

"FROM GENERAL SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS,
" *May 4, 1863, 11:15 A. M.*

"GENERAL HOOKER :

"The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such attack. It was assumed for attack and not for defence. It is not improbable that the bridges at Banks' Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked?

"JNO. SEDGWICK,
" *Major-General.*"

"As my bridges are two miles from me, I am compelled to cover them above or below from attack, with the additional assistance of General Benham's brigade alone.

"JNO. SEDGWICK,
" *Major-General.*"

No. 10.

As a matter of historic interest, showing as it does the composition of the army, we append a roster (nearly if not quite complete) of the Army of Northern Virginia, at the beginning of the campaign of Chancellorsville.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA (C. S.)

GENERAL ROBERT EDMUND LEE COMMANDING

Part of First Corps (LT.-GEN. JAS. LONGSTREET'S).

ANDERSON'S DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON.

Mahone's Brigade.—Brigadier-General WM. MAHONE.

Sixth Virginia..... Colonel Geo. T. Rodgers.
 Twelfth Virginia..... Lieutenant-Colonel Field.
 Sixteenth Virginia..... Lieutenant-Colonel Whitehead.
 Forty-First Virginia..... Colonel Parham.
 Sixty-first Virginia..... Colonel Grover.

Perry's Brigade.—Brigadier-General E. A. PERRY.

Second Florida.

Fifth Florida.

Eighth Florida.

Wilcox's Brigade.—Brigadier-General C. M. WILCOX.

Eighth Alabama..... Colonel Royston.
 Ninth Alabama..... Major Williams.
 Tenth Alabama..... Colonel Forney.
 Eleventh Alabama..... Colonel Sanders.
 Fourteenth Alabama..... Colonel Pinkard.

Posey's Brigade.—Brigadier-General CARNOT POSEY.

Twelfth Mississippi..... Major Thomas.
 Sixteenth Mississippi..... Colonel Baker.
 Nineteenth Mississippi..... Colonel Harris.
 Forty-eighth Mississippi.... Colonel Jayne.

Wright's Brigade.—Brigadier-General A. R. WRIGHT.

Second Georgia Battalion . . Major Ross.

Third Georgia Major Jones.

Twenty-second Georgia Lieutenant-Colonel Warden.

Forty-eighth Georgia Lieutenant-Colonel Carswell.

MCLAWS' DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. McLAWS.

Wofford's Brigade.—Brigadier-General W. S. WOFFORD.

Sixteenth Georgia.

Eighteenth Georgia.

Twenty-fourth Georgia.

Cobbs' Georgia Legion.

Phillip's Georgia Legion.

Kershaw's Brigade.—Brigadier-General J. B. KERSHAW.

Second South Carolina.

Third South Carolina.

Seventh South Carolina.

Fifteenth South Carolina.

James' South Carolina Battalion.

Barksdale's Brigade.—Brigadier-General WM. BARKSDALE.

Thirteenth Mississippi Colonel J. W. Carter.

Seventeenth Mississippi . . . Colonel Holder.

Eighteenth Mississippi Colonel Griffin.

Twenty-first Mississippi Colonel Ben. G. Humphreys.

Semmes' Brigade.—Brigadier-General PAUL J. SEMMES.

Tenth Georgia.

Fiftieth Georgia.

Fifty-first Georgia.

Fifty-third Georgia.

*Second Corps, LIEUT.-GEN. THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON.***D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.****BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. RODES.***Rodes' Brigade.*—Colonel ED. A. O'NEAL.

Third Alabama..... Captain Bonham.
 Fifth Alabama..... Colonel Josephus M. Hall.
 Sixth Alabama..... Lieutenant Lightfoot.
 Twelfth Alabama..... Colonel Samuel B. Pickens.
 Twenty-sixth Alabama..... Lieutenant-Colonel Garvin.

Doles' Brigade.—Brigadier-General GEORGE DOLES.

Fourth Georgia..... Colonel Philip Cook.
 Twelfth Georgia..... Colonel Edward Willis.
 Twenty-first Georgia..... Colonel John Thomas Mercer.
 Forty-fourth Georgia..... Lieutenant Colonel Lumpkin.

Iverson's Brigade.—Brigadier-General, ALFRED IVERSON.

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 Twelfth North Carolina..... Lieut.-Col. R. D. Johnston.
 Twentieth North Carolina..... Colonel T. F. Toon.
 Twenty-third North Carolina..... Colonel David H. Christie.

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 Nineteenth Georgia..... Colonel A. J. Hutchins.
 Twenty-third Georgia..... Colonel E. F. Best.
 Twenty-seventh Georgia..... Colonel C. T. Zachery.
 Twenty-eighth Georgia..... Colonel Tully Graybill.

Ramseur's Brigade.—Brigadier-General S. D. RAMSEUR.

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 Fourth North Carolina..... Colonel Bryan Grimes.
 Fourteenth North Carolina..... Colonel Resden Tyler Bennett.
 Thirtieth North Carolina..... Colonel Francis M. Parker.

A. P. HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. HILL.

Heth's Brigade.—Brigadier-General H. HETH.

Fortieth Virginia Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough.
 Fifty-fifth Virginia Colonel F. Mallory.
 Forty-seventh Virginia Colonel R. M. Mayo.
 Twenty-second Virginia Batt. Lieutenant E. P. Taylor.

McGowan's Brigade.—Brigadier-General S. MCGOWAN.

First South Carolina Colonel D. H. Hamilton.
 Twelfth South Carolina Colonel C. Jones.
 Thirteenth South Carolina . . Colonel O. E. Edwards.
 Fourteenth South Carolina . . Colonel Abner Perrin.
 Orr's Rifles Colonel Jas. M. Perrin.

Thomas' Brigade.—Brigadier-General E. L. THOMAS.

Fourteenth Georgia Colonel R. W. Folsom.
 Thirty-fifth Georgia Captain John Duke.
 Forty-fifth Georgia Lieutenant W. L. Grice.
 Forty-ninth Georgia Major S. T. Player.

Lane's Brigade.—Brigadier-General JAS. H. LANE.

Seventh North Carolina Colonel E. G. Haywood.
 Eighteenth North Carolina . Colonel T. J. Perdie.
 Twenty-eighth North Car . . . Colonel S. D. Lowe.
 Thirty-third North Carolina. Colonel C. M. Avery.
 Thirty-seventh North Car . . . Colonel W. M. Barbour.

Archer's Brigade.—Brigadier-General J. J. ARCHER.

First Tennessee Lieutenant-Colonel George.
 Seventh Tennessee Lieutenant-Colonel Fite.
 Fourteenth Tennessee Colonel William McComb.
 Thirteenth Alabama Colonel D. B. Fry.
 Fifth Alabama Battalion . . . Capt. Stewart.

Pender's Brigade.—Brigadier-General W. D. PENDER.

Thirteenth North Carolina . . Colonel A. M. Scales.
 Sixteenth North Carolina . . . Colonel J. S. McElroy.
 Twenty-second N. Carolina. Colonel Jas. Conner.
 Thirty-fourth N. Carolina . . . Colonel W. L. J. Lawrence.
 Thirty-eighth N. Carolina . . . Colonel W. J. Hoke.

EARLY'S DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY.

Gordon's Brigade.—Brigadier-General JNO. B. GORDON.

Thirteenth Georgia Colonel J. M. Smith.
 Twenty-sixth Georgia Colonel E. N. Atkinson.
 Thirty-first Georgia Colonel C. A. Evans.
 Thirty-eighth Georgia Major J. D. Matthews.
 Sixtieth Georgia Colonel W. H. Stiles.
 Sixty-first Georgia Colonel J. H. Lamar.

Hays' Brigade.—Brigadier-General HARRY T. HAYS.

Fifth Louisiana Colonel Henry Forno.
 Sixth Louisiana Colonel Wm. Monaghan.
 Seventh Louisiana Colonel D. B. Penn.
 Eighth Louisiana Colonel Henry B. Kelley.
 Ninth Louisiana Colonel A. L. Stafford.

Hoke's Brigade.—Brigadier-General R. F. HOKE.

Sixth North Carolina Colonel J. E. Avery.
 Twenty-first North Carolina. Colonel W. W. Kirkland.
 Fifty-fourth North Carolina . Colonel J. C. T. McDowell.
 Fifty-seventh North Carolina Colonel A. C. Godwin.
 First Battalion N. Carolina . Major R. H. Wharton.

Smith's Brigade.—Brigadier-General WM. SMITH.

Thirteenth Virginia Colonel J. A. Walker.
 Forty-ninth Virginia Colonel Gibson.
 Fifty-second Virginia Colonel Michael G. Harman.
 Fifty-eighth Virginia Colonel F. H. Board.

TRIMBLE'S DIVISION.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. E. COLSTON.

Paxton's Brigade ("Stonewall").—Brig.-Gen. E. F. PAXTON.

Second Virginia Colonel J. Q. A. Nadenbousch.
 Fourth Virginia Colonel Chas. A. Ronald.
 Fifth Virginia Colonel J. H. S. Funk.
 Twenty-seventh Virginia.... Colonel J. K. Edmondson.
 Thirty-third Virginia Colonel F. M. Holladay.

J. R. Jones' Brigade.—Brigadier-General J. R. JONES.

Twenty-first Virginia Captain Mosely.
 Forty-second Virginia Lieutenant-Colonel Withers.
 Forty-fourth Virginia Captain Buckner.
 Forty-eighth Virginia Colonel T. S. Garnett.
 Fiftieth Virginia Colonel Vandeventer.

Colston's Brigade.—Colonel E. T. H. WARREN.

Tenth Virginia Major Stover.
 Twenty-third Virginia Colonel A. G. Taliaferro.
 Thirty-seventh Virginia Colonel T. V. Williams.
 First North Carolina Colonel J. A. McDowell.
 Third North Carolina Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston.

Nicholls' Brigade.—Brigadier-General F. T. NICHOLLS.

First Louisiana Colonel Wm. R. Shivers.
 Second Louisiana Colonel J. M. Williams.
 Tenth Louisiana Colonel E. Waggaman.
 Fourteenth Louisiana Colonel Z. York.
 Fifteenth Louisiana Colonel Edw. Pendleton.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

Lee's Cavalry Brigade.—Brigadier-General FITZ LEE.

First Virginia Cavalry.

Second Virginia Cavalry.

Third Virginia Cavalry Colonel Owen.

Fourth Virginia Cavalry Colonel Wickham.


Fifth Virginia Cavalry Colonel Tyler.

ARTILLERY.

Carter's Battalion	{	Page's Battery.
	{	Fry's Battery.
	{	Carter's Battery.
	{	Jeff. Davis Battery
Jones' Battalion	{	Carrington's Battery
	{	Garber's Battery.
	{	Thompson's Battery.
	{	Fauver's Battery.
Walker's Battalion	{	Marye's Battery.
	{	Latham's Battery.
	{	Bronson's Battery.
	{	McGraw's Battery.
	{	Crenshaw's Battery.
	{	Davidson's Battery.
McIntosh's Battalion	{	Rice's Battery.
	{	Lusk's Battery
	{	Hart's Battery.
	{	Johnson's Battery.
Brown's Battalion	{	Smith's Battery.
	{	Watson's Battery.
	{	Dance's Battery.
	{	Huff's Battery.
	{	Brooke's Battery.
Alexander's Battalion	{	Jordan's Battery.
	{	Rhett's Battery.
	{	Moody's Battery.
	{	Parker's Battery.
	{	Eubank's Battery


Garnett's Battalion	{ Lewis' Battery. Grundy's Battery. Moore's Battery. Maurice's Battery.
Major Hamilton (Cabell's Battalion)	{ McCarthy's Battery. Manly's Battery.
Andrew's Battalion.	
Horse Artillery.	
Reserve Artillery.	





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